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Abstract 
This paper integrates logical and probabilistic approaches to the representation of planning 
problems by developing a first-order logic of time, chance, and action. We start by making 
explicit and precise commonsense notions about time, chance, and action central to the planning 
problem. We then develop a logic, the semantics of which incorporates these intuitive properties. 
The logical language integrates both modal and probabilistic constructs and allows quantification 
over time points, probability values, and domain individuals. Probability is treated as a sentential 
operator in the language, so it can be arbitrarily nested and combined with other logical operators. 
The language can represent the chance that facts hold and events occur at various times. It 
can represelnt he chance that actions and other events affect the future. The model of action 
distinguishes between action feasibility, executability, and effects. We present a proof theory for 
the logic and show how the logic can be used to describe actions in such a way that the action 
descriptions can be composed to infer properties of plans via the proof theory. 
1. Introduction 
Most AI planning systems to date [ 7,18,47,55] have used variations of situation 
calculus to represent planning knowledge. This has limited their ability to represent 
temporal knowledge as well as to deal with uncertainty in the planning domain. Re- 
searchers in AI have used temporal logics to formalize the temporal aspects of planning 
problems [ 1,20,40,45,50] and they have developed probability logics for representing 
uncertainty [ 3,24,26]. But little work has been done toward developing a formal lan- 
guage that integrates these two representational capabilities in the context of planning. 
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This paper presents a logic for representing time, chance, and action. We show that by 
integrating temporal and probabilistic representations in a common formalism we can 
represent aspects of planning problems that cannot be represented if the two are treated 
separately. We exploit one of the advantages of using a logical language by building 
commonsense notions of time, chance, and action directly into the model theory, Thus 
commonsense inferences follow directly from the semantics of the language. Since such 
a language can be used to analyze planning problems and prove the correctness of 
planning algorithms, it represents a significant step toward building planners for more 
realistic domains. ’ 
In the present work, planning is viewed as the process of formulating and choosing 
a set of actions which when executed will likely achieve a desirable outcome. Actions 
in a plan may be performed to affect the state of knowledge of the performing agent, 
to affect the state of the world, or simply for their own sake. The present work focuses 
on the last two types of action. To choose appropriate courses of such action, an agent 
must reason about the state of the world, conditions in the world that his actions can 
influence and the extent to which he can influence them, and, conversely, conditions in 
the world that influence his actions and the extent of that influence. 
Many aspects of the world are inherently stochastic, so a representation for reason- 
ing about plans must be able to express chances of conditions in the world as well as 
indeterminacy in the effects of actions and events. For example, smoking does not deter- 
ministically cause lung cancer; it only greatly increases one’s chance of contracting lung 
cancer. Uncertain environmental factors can influence a smoker’s chance of contracting 
cancer as can uncertainty in the effects of smoking. 
Reasoning about plans requires the ability to reason about time. Facts tend to be true 
for periods of time, and actions and events occur at particular times. Actions comprising 
a plan may occur sequentially or concurrently. Actions and events affect the future, but 
not the past. Chance evolves with time: the chance of rain tomorrow may not be the 
same now as it will be tonight. Ambiguities in the world are resolved with time: before 
a fair coin is flipped the chance of heads is 50% but after it is flipped it either certainly 
landed heads or it certainly did not. 
This paper presents a first-order logic of time, chance, and action for representing 
and reasoning about plans. The developed logic represents time in terms of possible 
world-histories. Possibility is represented in terms Kripke structures [34] by defining 
an accessibility relation over the world-histories. Chance is represented by defining gen- 
eralized Kripke structures in terms of probability distributions over the world-histories. 
By integrating both modal and probabilistic constructs, the logical language can rep- 
resent and distinguish between possibility, probability, and truth. The language allows 
quantification over time points, probability values, and domain individuals. Probability 
is treated as a sentential operator in the language, so it can be arbitrarily nested and 
combined with other logical operators. The probability operator is temporally indexed 
so it can capture the dynamic nature of chance. 
’ Haddawy ( 2 I 1 uses the logic presented here to analyze and prove correct components of a construction 
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Our modlel of possibility is similar to that presented by Pelavin [43]. Our model of 
chance in the context of branching time is based on that of van Fraassen [57]. The 
probabilistic component of our logic is similar to Halpem’s [26] probability logic & 
to Bacchus’ [ 31 logic of propositional probabilities, and to Haddawy and Frisch’s [ 241 
logic of staged probabilities. 
1.1. Temporal logic 
Temporal logics represent change by specifying what is true in the world at various 
times. They can be classified as being either interval- or point-based. A point-based logic 
associates a time point with each temporal object. Most work on plan representation in 
AI has use’d interval-based logics which associate a time interval with each temporal 
object. Through the use of intervals, actions, events, and facts can have temporal extent. 
This means that these temporal languages can represent plans with concurrent actions as 
well as conditions during the execution of an action that influence the action. For this 
reason, the logic of time, chance, and action developed in this paper uses time intervals 
as well. 
Temporal logics can be further classified as being either linear or branching. Linear 
time logics [ 1,2] model only the actual world and thus can only represent that an 
event actually occurs at a given time. In contrast, branching time logics [20,40,45] 
model all possible worlds and thus can represent whether or not an event can possibly 
occur, as well as its various possible times of occurrence. Since we are interested in 
representing chance, which can be roughly thought of as a degree of possibility, we will 
use a branching time logic. Chance is modeled by defining probability distributions over 
the branching time structure. 
1.2. Probalnlity 
Semantic theories of probability may be classified into three main schools: logi- 
cal [ 5,321, frequentist [ 58,591, and subjectivist [ 37,46,48]. The logical theory takes 
probabilitie,s to represent a logical relationship between a given hypothesis and given 
evidence. The frequentist view identifies probability with some suitably defined relative 
frequency. The subjectivist school takes probability to represent the degrees of belief 
of a rational agent. Of the three views, the subjective interpretation has the most solid 
semantic fcundation. But while subjective probability theory dictates how degrees of 
belief should be represented, it does not provide us with guidance for structuring knowl- 
edge about the world. Since we are interested in reasoning about the effects of actions 
on the state of the world, we would like our representation of uncertainty to account for 
some aspects of probabilistic causality. Subjectivists have proposed subjective theories 
of objective chance that account for causality by imposing some additional constraints 
on beliefs [39,53,57]. The current work builds upon van Fraassen’s model of objective 
chance. 
But probability theory alone is not representationally adequate for reasoning about 
plans. Probability theory does not include a notion of quantification. First-order quan- 
tification provides great representational economy by allowing us to describe properties 
shared by general classes of actions, events, and facts. For example, rather than having 
to define a different lifting action for each possible object, we can describe the class 
of lifting actions, where the object being lifted is left as a quantified variable. Further- 
more, probability theory provides no vocabulary for describing planning problems [ 60, 
p. 5701. We would like a language that facilitates representing the salient features of 
planning problems. This paper addresses both these limitations. 
1.3. Use of the logic 
We show in Section 4 that the logic of time, chance, and action is not completely 
axiomatizable. So we do not foresee building a theorem prover for the logic as a 
means of solving planning problems. Even if this were possible, it would likely be 
too inefficient to be useful. Rather, the logic is intended to be used as a tool in the 
representation and analysis of planning problems involving time and chance. It enables 
us to design planning algorithms for these problems in a principled manner. Representing 
the data structures and assumptions of a planner in our logic makes explicit and precise 
the meaning of the knowledge embodied in the planning algorithm in such a way that 
we can analyze what is entailed by this knowledge without reference to the planning 
algorithm itself. We can then refer to this formal semantics to prove the algorithm 
correct. 
1.4. Organization of the paper 
Section 2 presents the ontology of the logic. It discusses the desired properties of 
time, chance, and action at an intuitive level, without recourse to logical fo~alism. 
Section 3 formalizes the concepts discussed in the ontology by presenting the syntax 
and semantics of the logic. Constraints are imposed on the semantic model in order to 
obtain the desired intuitive properties. Section 4 presents a proof theory for the logic 
and derives several useful theorems illustrating the use of the proof theory. Numerous 
axioms and theorems are statements of the intuitive properties discussed in the ontology. 
Section 5 discusses how the logic can be used to describe properties of actions and 
plans. We show that the logic captures the natural temporal relation between cause and 
effect. Section 6 shows how the logic can be used to describe and reason about planning 
problems. We describe individual com~nents of a planning problem and compose them 
to reason about the overall problem. Section 7 discusses related work, and Section 8 
draws conclusions. 
2. Ontology 
In this section we seek to sharpen the reader’s intuitions concerning those as- 
pects of the world described by the logic: time, facts/events, actions, possibility, and 
chance. 
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Fig. I. A temporal tree. 
2.1. Time 
Time is modeled as a collection of world-histories, each of which is one possible 
chronology or history of events throughout time. At any given point in time, some of 
the world-histories will naturally share a common past up to that time. Thus the world- 
histories form a tree structure that branches into the future. No special status is given 
to the time “now”, so the temporal tree branches into the future relative to each point 
in time. Fig. 1 shows the structure of a typical temporal tree. The present work is only 
concerned with future-branching time because actions and events can only affect the 
state of the world at times after their occurrence. That is to say, at each point in time, 
the past is fixed-no occurrences in the world will cause it to change. But at each point 
in time the future might unfold in any number of ways, which are influenced by the 
agent’s actions as well as by other events. So relative to any point in time, only one 
possible past exists, but numerous possible futures exist. * 
2.2. Facts and events 
The world is described in terms of facts and events. Facts tend to hold and events tend 
to occur over intervals of time. So facts and events are associated with the time intervals 
over which they hold or occur in the various world-histories. Facts are distinguished 
from events on the basis of their temporal properties. A fact may hold over several 
intervals in any given world-history and if a fact holds over an interval then it holds 
over all subintervals of that interval. So, for example, my car may be alternately clean 
and dirty over several different time periods in a given world-history and if my car is 
clean over a period of time, then it is clean throughout that time. See Fig. 1. 
Events are somewhat more complex than facts. First, one must distinguish between 
event types and event tokens. An event type is a general class of events and an event 
token is a specific instance of an event type. For example, a vase breaking is an event 
type, and the brown vase in my office breaking at 9:00 am is an event token of that 
type. So event types are sets of event tokens. Event tokens are unique individuals-the 
interval over which an event token occurs is the unique interval containing the event 
* For a more thorough discussion of why a future-branching time model is appropriate for representing effects 
see the article by Mellor [4 I I. 
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Fig. 2. Action representation. 
token and an event token can occur at most once in any world-history. If a vase breaks 
during a time period, there is no smaller period of time during which the event token 
of the vase breaking can be said to have occurred. On the other hand, numerous tokens 
of a given event type may occur during a particular interval. For example, two different 
vases can break concurrently. So if a token of an event type occurs over an interval, 
it is possible for another token of that type to occur over a subinterval, but it is not 
necessary as it is in the case of facts. The present work deals with event types, which 
for brevity are simply referred to as events. 
The fact/event dichotomy just described is a simplification of the true situation. As 
Shoham [50] has shown, there are many different types of facts and events, character- 
ized by their temporal properties. Although Shoham’s refined categories of fact types 
constitute a more useful and accurate picture of the world than the simple fact/event 
dichotomy, the fact/event categorization will be used for simplicity of exposition. Ex- 
tending the work to encompass Shoham’s categories is completely straightforward. 
2.3. Actions 
Actions are similar to events but are distinguished from events by the fact that an 
action is brought about by an agent. We view the planning problem from the perspective 
of the planning agent. From this perspective, only the planning agent’s own actions are 
acts; all other actions appear as events. An action is initiated by an attempt: the agent 
attempts an action and, if conditions are right, the action occurs. The occurrence of 
the action will have certain effects. Likewise, if conditions are such that the attempt of 
the action does not result in its occurrence, the attempt will have other effects. 3 The 
situation is depicted in Fig. 2. Once an agent attempts an action, whether or not the 
action occurs is a function of chance; furthermore, what effects the action’s success or 
failure will have is also a function of chance. 
Distinguishing the attempt of an action from its occurrence facilitates several useful 
inferences. First, it facilitates reasoning about actions as goals. Examples of such goals 
are going skiing or eating at one’s favorite restaurant. In planning for such goals, we 
are interested in finding circumstances under which the attempt of the action will result 
in its occurrence. 
Second, separating the attempt of an action from its occurrence allows us to distinguish 
between effects due to the occurrence from effects due to the attempt. For example, 
lifting an object will result in the agent’s holding it but attempting to lift an object that 
is too heavy may result in the agent straining his back. One advantage of being able to 
3 In the Al literature the effects of the action’s occurrence are typically called intended @ects. 
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Generative Event 
’ Generated Event I 
Fig. 3. Relative times of generative and generated events. 
make this distinction is that we can distinguish between a plan achieving a goal through 
its occurrence and a plan achieving a goal as a side-effect of its attempt. 
Third, the separation facilitates temporal reasoning about actions. Action occurrences 
can span time, allowing us to reason about conditions during an action. Furthermore, 
the amount of time required for an action to occur once it is attempted can be allowed 
to vary, depending on conditions. 
As with events, we distinguish action tokens and action types. Action tokens and 
action type:5 are analogous to event tokens and event types. Our representation of action 
tokens is based on Goldman’s [ 191 theory of action individuation in which he defines a 
generation relation that holds between certain actions. An act token A generates an act 
token A’ if it can be said that A’ was done by doing A. For example, “flipping the light 
switch” and “turning on the light” are related by generation. So rather than saying that 
the two are different descriptions of the same action or that they are two completely 
different actions, Goldman says that they are two different actions but are related by 
generation. Generally A and A’ will be causally related but other relationships are also 
possible. Goldman [ 19, Chapter 21 details four different relationships that he classifies 
as generation. 
We define an action token to be composed of a generative vent token, representing 
the action’$, attempt and a generated event token, representing the event associated with 
the successful occurrence of the action. The two event tokens are related by generation: 
the agent brings about the generated event token by bringing about by the generative 
event token. Take the example action token of starting my car. This might consist of the 
generative event token turn-key and the generated event token car-starts. An action type 
is simply a set of action tokens. We will be primarily concerned with action types and 
will refer to them simply as actions. 
We impose constraints on the temporal relation between the generative events and 
the generated event of an action token. The beginning time of the generative event 
must coincide with the beginning time of the generated event and the end time of the 
generative event must not occur after the end time of the generated event. See Fig. 3. 
2.4. Possibility 
Because the present work is concerned with representing actions that affect the state of 
the world, the kind of possibility we are interested in describing is objective possibility. 
Something is objectively possible if it either was true in the past or could be true in 
the future. So possibility is taken relative to a point in time in the temporal tree. Since 
actions and. events can only affect the future, conditions in the present and past relative 
to a given time are either inevitably true or inevitably false. 
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2.5. Chance 
Chance is introduced by defining probabilities over the tree of possible futures. Like 
possibility, chance is taken relative to a given point in time. As a consequence of the 
property that the past is inevitably true or inevitably false and the fact that inevitability 
implies probability one, it follows that the chance of the past is either zero or one. In this 
way, actions and other events can only affect the probabilities of future facts and events. 
This type of probability is objective, as opposed to subjective. Subjectively the past can 
be uncertain but objectively it is completely determined. For example, subjectively I may 
be uncertain as to whether my company’s stock rose or fell yesterday, but objectively 
it either certainly rose or it certainly did not and, furthermore, there is nothing I can 
do now to change that. The other property imposed on objective chance is that the 
chance be completely determined by the history up to the current time. So objective 
chance is purely a function of the state of the world. In contrast, subjective probability 
is a function not only of the state of the world but also of the epistemic state of an 
agent. 
There is a subtle reason for distinguishing between possibility and chance. It is 
tempting to think that possibility could just be represented by saying that the probability 
is non-zero but this is not the case. The problem is that in an uncountably infinite 
sample space possible events can have probability zero. For example, suppose you pick 
a real number randomly in the interval [0, 11. For each number the probability that 
it will be picked is zero, yet it is possible that it will be picked. The ability to make 
this distinction will become essential when we discuss action feasibility in Section 5. 
Possibility and chance are related by the fact that impossibility implies probability zero 
and inevitability implies probability one. 
2.4. Planning 
Within the ontological framework just outlined, planning becomes the task of nav- 
igating from the present to the future along a temporal tree in an effort to attain a 
world-history in which the goal condition is satisfied. But an agent has only partial con- 
trol over its path through the tree: the state of the world is uncertain, action effects are 
not necessarily deterministic, and external events may influence the path of the agent. 
For example, consider the temporal tree shown in Fig. 4. The temperature is below 
freezing in worlds WI and w2 and above freezing in the rest of the worlds. So there is a 
70% chance that the temperature is below freezing. The car is certain to start if the key 
is turned when the temperature is above freezing but there is only 57% chance that the 
car will start given that the key is turned when the temperature is below freezing. Thus, 
by turning the key, the agent can only partially control its path through the tree. 
3. The logic of time, chance, and action 
To formalize the concepts discussed in the ontology, we now define the language of 
the logic of time, chance, and action, f,:,,. First in order to provide a vocabulary for 
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Fig. 4. Navigating the temporal tree. 
referring to the elements of our ontology, we specify the syntax of the language. The 
language of .Li,, is a first-order language with modal operators to express possibility and 
chance. Since chance is treated as a sentential operator, it can be combined freely with 
other logical operators. The language allows quantification over probabilities, time points, 
and domain individuals. The syntax of the probabilistic component of the language is 
similar to that of Bacchus’ [ 31 logic of propositional probabilities and the syntax of the 
temporal component of the logic is based on both Shoham’s [ 501 and Pelavin’s [43] 
temporal logics. 
3.1. Syntax 
The language of L,, contains four predicates. To refer to facts and event types 
occurring in time, the language contains two predicates: HOu)S( FA, tl , t2) is true if 
fact FA holds over the time interval tl to t2, and OCCURS(EYtl, t2) is true if event 
EV occurs during the interval tl to t2. Henceforth we will use the symbol t, possibly 
subscripted, to denote time points; 4, $, and y to denote formulas; and LY and /3 to 
denote probability values. 
The language contains two predicates to describe actions: AZT( A, tA) is true if action 
A is attempted beginning at time tA, and OCC(A, tA,tL) is true if action A occurs 
during the interval tA to t>. 
In addition to the usual first-order logical operators, the language contains three modal 
operators to express inevitability, possibility, and chance. The operators are subscripted 
with a time since, according to the ontology, possibility, inevitability, and chance are 
taken relative to a point in time. We write O,(4) to indicate that c~5 is inevitably true 
at time t and OI (4) to say that 4 is possibly true at time t. We write P, (#) to denote 
the probability of 4 at time t. Probability is treated as a sentential operator in the object 
language. So the probability operator can be arbitrarily nested and combined with the 
inevitability and possibility operators, allowing us to write complex sentences like: 
Such a treatment is useful for writing sentences about conditional probability. The 
probability of 4 given $ is traditionally defined as 
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prob($ I 9) =prob(4 A ti,)lprobt$,). 
If the probability of the conditioning sentence I/ is zero, then the conditional probability 
is undefined. In this case, a conditional probability sentence like prob(4 1 I,/?) = a 
can be assigned neither the value true nor the value false. Rather than introducing a 
new conditional probability operator and dealing with this truth assignment problem, 
sentences about conditional probability can simply be written in the form 
Note that this sentence is true for all values of (Y if P,($) = 0. The standard conditional 
probability notation will be used to syntactically denote a sentence of the above form: 
Definition 1 (c-prob) . 
The language of L,, contains three types of terms: ordinary domain object terms, 
temporal terms, and probability terms and four types of relations: numeric relations, fact 
relations, event relations, and action relations. 
The lexicon of the language consists of the following disjoint sets of non-logical 
symbols: 
l C a set of object constant symbols; 
l TC, a set of time constant symbols; 
l NC, a set of numeric constant symbols; 
l V, a set of object variables; 
l TV, a set of temporal variables; 
l PV, a set of probability variables; 
l FCT, a set of object function symbols; 
l NFCT, a set of numeric function symbols, including +, -, ., /; 
l PFCT, a set of probability function symbols for representing distribution functions; 
l FR, a set of fact relation symbols; 
l ER, a set of event relation symbols; 
l AR, a set of action relation symbols; and 
l NR, the set { <, <, =, 2, >} of numeric relation symbols. 
Note that we will use the symbols <, <, =, 2, > to denote numeric relations in both 
the object and the meta-language. It will be clear from context which interpretation is 
meant. 
The set of well-formed formulas combining the logical and non-logical symbols is 
recursively defined as follows. 
( I ) The set of object terms (o-terms) contains members of C, all members of V, 
as well as all terms of the form f(otrml ,...,otrm,,), where f E FCT and 
otrml,..., otrm, are o-terms. 
(2) The set of temporal terms (t-terms) contains all members of TC, all members 
of TV, as well as all terms of the form f( ttrml , . . . , ttm,,), where f E NFCT 
and ttrml , . . . , ttrm, are t-terms. 
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(3) The set of probability terms (p-terms) contains all members of NC, all members 
of PV, all terms of the form f( trml, . . . , trm,), where f E PFCT U NFCT and 
trml,. . . , trm, are t-terms or p-terms, as well as all terms of the form P,,, (qb), 
where 4 is a wff and ttrm is a t-term. 
(4) If trml and trm2 are both t-terms or p-terms then ttrml < ttrm2 is a wff, and 
similarly for 6, =, 2, >. 
(5) If ttrmt and ttrrn2 are t-terms, trml , . . . , trm, are o-terms or t-terms, and fr is 
an n-ary fact relation symbol then HOLDScfr( h-ml,. . . , trm,), ttrml , ttrm2) is 
a wfF. 
(6) If ttrml and ttrm2 are t-terms, trml, . . . , trm, are o-terms or t-terms, and er is 
an n-ary event relation symbol then OCCURS( er( trml , . . . , trm,) , ttrml , ttrm2) 
is a ,wff. 
(7) If ttrml is a t-term, trml , . . . , trm,, are o-terms or t-terms, and ar is an n-ary 
action relation symbol then ATT(ar( trm] , . . . , trm,) , ttrml ) is a wff. 
(8) If ttrml and ttrm2 are t-terms, trml, . . . , trm, are o-terms or t-terms, and ar is 
an n-ary action relation symbol then OCC(ur( trml , . . . , b-m,,), ttrm] , ttrm;!) is 
a wff. 
(9) If ohm] and otrmz are o-terms then otrml = otrm2 is a wff. 
(IO) If 41 and 42 are wffs then so are ~$1, $1 A 42, 41 V 42, and 41 -+ 42. 
(II) If+isawffandzEVUTVUPVthenVz4and3z4arewffs. 
( 12) If 4 is a wff and ttrm is a t-term then Cl,, (4) and O,,, (4) are wffs. 
We use the symbol = to denote equality between object terms, probability terms, and 
temporal terms. The meaning will be clear from the context. 
Notice that the syntax of the language is restricted to disallow sentences that would 
be meaninglefss in the intended interpretation of the language. For example the following 
sentence is not well-formed because it does not make sense for a probability term to be 
used as a time point: 
3. I. 1. Examples of representing planning knowledge 
Now that we have defined the syntax of the language, we can see how the language 
can represent various types of planning knowledge. The language allows us to write 
sentences that describe: 
l Uncertai-nty in the state of the world: there is a 60% chance of a power glitch 
between noon and 5:OO. 
P,,,(Itl, t2 (noon < tl < tf < 5:00) A 
OCCURS(power-glitch, t], t2)) = 0.6. 
l Uncertainty of action effects: there is a 50% chance that the coin will land heads 
when flipped. 
Yt, rl, t2 (t < tl) -+ Pr(3t3 OCCURS(land(coin,heads), t2, tg) ) 
OCC(flip(coin), tl, t2)) = 0.5. 
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l Conditions during an action that influence its effects: holding the oven temperature 
constant increases the likelihood that the souffle will turn out right. 
Vt,tl.t2 (t < tl) ---f Pt(3tg HOLDS(done-right(souffle),tz,ts) 1 
OCClJRS( bake( souffle), tl , t2) A 
3xHOLDS(temp(oven,x),ti,t~)) > 
P, ( 3t3 HOLDS( done-right (souffle), t2, tl ) 1 
OCCURS( bake( souffle), tl , t2) ) . 
l Conditions not influenced by an action: the chance of rain is independent of my 
clapping my hands. 
~t,tl,t2vt3,t4 (tl < t3) + 
P, (HOLDS( raining, tg , t4) 1 OCC( clap, tl , t2) ) = 
P, (HOLDS( raining, tg , t4) ) . 
l Concurrent actions: it is not possible for me to raise and lower my arm at the same 
time. 
Vt, ti, t2, tg, t4 Cl, [OCC(raise(arm), tl, t2) A OCC(lower(arm), t3, t4) -+ 
(t2 < t3) v (t4 < t1>1. 
l External events: there is a 90% chance that the computer will crash if a power 
glitch occurs. 
tltl, t2 P,,,(33, t4 (tl < tj 6 t2) A OCCURS(crash(computer), t3, t4) 1 
OCCURS(power-glitch, tl , t2) ) = 0.9. 
l Temporally qualified goals: be at the bank before 5:OOpm. 
3ti, t2 (tl < 5:OO) A HOLDS( loc( me,bank) , tl , t2). 
Furthermore, the language allows us to write sentences that 
l Combine possibility and chance: there is a 50% chance that by noon a train crash 
will inevitably occur between 3:00 and 5:OO. 
P,,,(3t, (tl < noon) A cl,, (32, t3 (3:OO < t2 q tg < 5:OO)A 
OCClJRS(crash(train), t2, tg))) = 0.5. 
l Distinguish between truth and chance: I won the lottery even though it was unlikely. 
(to < tl < t2 < now) A P,,(OCCURS(win-lottery, tl, t2)) = 0.0001 A 
OCCURS( win-lottery, tI , t2). 
l Express information about probability distributions: the arrival time of the train is 
normally distributed about noon. 
‘dt P,,,,( 3t’ OCCURS( arrive, t, t’) ) = N( t, noon, 1 Omin) , 
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where N( t, noon, IOmin) is a normal distribution over the variable t with mean 
noon and variance IOmin. 
3.2. Semantics 
So far we have only specified a formal way of writing down sentences in the language 
of &I. We need some way of assigning meaning to these sentences. This is done 
through the use of model-theoretic semantics. The elements of the model correspond 
closely to tlhe elements identified in the ontology. The models contain a set of possible 
world-histories as well as sets of facts, events, and actions. The temporal tree structure 
is created by defining an accessibility relation over the world-histories. Possibility is 
then defined with respect to this accessibility relation. Chance is defined in terms of 
probability distributions over the temporal tree. The desired properties identified in the 
ontology are obtained by placing a number of semantic constraints on the models. A 
model is a ltuple 
(LY D, FN, NFN, PFN, FRL, ERL, ARL, NRL, FA, EVENTS, 
EV, ACTS, ACTIONS, R, X, PR, F), 
where: 
l W is the set of possible world-histories, called worlds. 
l D is the non-empty domain of individuals. 
l FN is I:he set of object functions: Dk -+ D. 
l NFN is the set of numeric functions: Rk -+ IR. 
l PFN is the set of probability functions: Bk + IR. 
l FRL is the set of fact relations: Dk --+ 2(wxllp)xw. 
l ERL is the set of event relations: Dk --f 2(“llp) xw. 
l ARL is the set of action relations: Dk -+ 2ACTS. 
l NRL is the set of numeric relations, a subset of 2@. 
l FA is the set of facts, a subset of 2 (wxR)xw. A fact is a set of (temporal interval, 
world) pairs: {((tl, t{),w~), . . . , ((tn, tL),w,,)}. Iffa is a fact and ((t,, tz), w) l fa 
then fa holds throughout interval (tl , t2) in world-history w. 
l EVENTS is the set of event tokens, a subset of (Iw x R) x W. An event token is a 
single (temporal interval, world) pair. 
l EV is I:he set of event types, a subset of 2EVENTS. An event type is a set of event 
tokens: {((tl, t;), WI), . . . , ((tn, t;), w,)}. If ev is an event and ((tl, tz), w) E ev 
then ev occurs during interval (tl , t2) in world-history w. 
l ACTS is the set of action tokens, a subset of 2 EVx EV. An action token is an ordered 
pair consisting of a generative event token and a generated event token: (gev, Gev). 
We will find it useful to define two functions in the meta-language in order to pick 
out the generative and generated event tokens: gen(act) is the generative event 
token of act and Gen(act) is the generated event token of act. 
l ACTIONS is the set of action types, a subset of 2ACrs. An action type is a set 
of actison tokens: { (gevl , Gev I), (gevz, Gevz), . . .}. For example, the start-car ac- 
tion might be represented as {((turn-key, tl, tz), (car-starts, t1, tg)), . . .}. Note that 
2% 
. 
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the action type, event type, and fact corresponding to the empty set denote the 
impossible action, event, and fact, respectively. 
R is an accessibility relation defined on Rx W x W. R( t, WI, WZ) means that world- 
histories WI and w2 are indistinguishable up to and including time t. Making worlds 
indistinguishable through time t disallows instantaneous effects, i.e. there must be 
some time between the occurrence of an event and its effects. If R( t, WI, ~2) we 
say a world-history w;? is R-accessible from wt at time t. The set of all world- 
histories R-accessible from w at time t will be designated Rr. For each time t, the 
R;’ partition the world-histories into sets of equivalence classes indistinguishable 
up to t. 
X is a a-algebra over W,4 containing all the sets corresponding to wffs in the 
language, as well as all R-equivalence classes of world-histories. 
PR is a probability assignment function that assigns to each time t E iR and world- 
history w E W a countably additive probability distribution &” defined over X. 
F is the denotation function, defined as follows: 
C -+ D, 
NC--+@& 
TC -+ Iw, 
FCT -+ FN, 
NFCT --+ NFN, 
PFCT + PFN, 
FR --+ FRL, 
ER -+ ERL, 
NR -+ NRL. 
Henceforth, M will be used to refer a model with the eighteen components named above. 
The reader will note that constants, functions, and relations are rigid with respect to 
both time and world-history. Rigidity with respect to world-history simplifies the logic 
somewhat and could be relaxed without much effort. Non-rigidity with respect to time 
seems to be basically incompatible with the current framework since it would result in 
undesirable interpretations like the following. At time tt a term like Blue(car) could 
denote the fact that my car is blue from to to tg and at time t2 it could denote the fact 
that my car is blue from 24 to ts. 
3.2.1. Semantic constraints 
In Section 2 the ontology of the logic was discussed from an intuitive standpoint. In 
order to obtain the desired intuitive properties, a number of constraints must be imposed 
on the models. These constraints, labeled (Cl)-(C8) are presented in the following 
discussion. 
4 A v-algebra over W is a class of subsets that contains W and is closed under complement and countable 
union. 
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t1 t2 13 
Fig. 5. Structure imposed by the R-accessibility relation 
The future-branching temporal tree is defined in terms of the R-relation over world- 
histories. To capture the property that time does not branch into the past, we say that 
if two world-histories are indistinguishable up to time f2 then they are indistinguishable 
up to any earlier time: 
(Cl) If tt < t2 and R(~~,wI,w~) then R(tt,wt,w2). 
Since R just represents the indistinguishability of histories up to a time t, for a fixed 
time R is an equivalence relation, i.e., reflexive, symmetric, and transitive: 
(C2) R(r, w, w). 
If R(t,wt,w~) then R(t,w:!,wt). 
If R(t,wt,w:!) and R(?,w:!,w~) then R(t,wt,ws). 
Fig. 5 illustrates that the R-relation ties together the different world-histories to form 
the temporal tree structure discussed in Section 2. 
As mentisoned earlier, facts and events differ in their temporal properties. This dis- 
tinction is captured by the following two semantic constraints. If a fact holds over an 
interval, it holds over all subintervals, except possibly at the endpoints: 
(C3) If tt <t:! < ts G t4, tt Z ts, t2 + t4,fuE FA and ((t,,td),w) cfa 
then ((t2, t3), w) cfu. 
An event token occurs only once in each world-history: 
(C4) If evt E EVENTS, ((tl, tz), w) E evt, and ((tg, tq), w) E evt 
then tl = tg and t2 = t4. 
If two worlds are indistinguishable up to a time then they must share a common past 
up to that time. And if they share a common past up to a given time, they must agree 
on all facts and events up to that time. To enforce this relationship, we impose the 
constraint that if two world-histories are R-accessible at time t, they must agree on all 
facts (events) that hold (occur) over intervals ending before or at the same time as t: 
(C5) If to < tI < t2 and R(t2, WI, w2) then ((to, tl), w1) E A 
iff ((to, tl), w;?) E A, where A is a fact or event. 
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Section 2 mentions two desired characteristics of the probability operator. The first is 
that the probability at a time t be completely determined by the history up to that time. 
The second desired characteristic is that the probability of the present and past should 
be either zero or one. These two properties follow as meta-theorems from the following 
two constraints: 
(C6) For all X E X, t 6 t’, and W, W’ such that R( t, w, w’), 
,u;(R;‘) > 0 --+ &Y’(X) = ,$‘(X 1 R$). 
(C7) #(R;) > 0. 
Meta-Theorem 2. The probability of the present and past is either zero or one. 
&‘( RF) = 1. 
Proof. 
1. &‘(RP) >0 (C7) 
2. ,$(I?:) = &‘( Ry 1 RF) Modus Ponens: (C6), I 
3. &‘(R,“) = 1 def of conditional probability, 
Defining the probabilities in this way makes good intuitive sense if we look at the 
meaning of R. Rr designates the set of world-histories that are objectively possible with 
respect to w at time t. It is natural that the set of world-histories that are objectively 
likely with respect to w at time t should be a subset of the ones that are possible. 
Theorem 3. If two worlds are indistinguishable up to time t then they have identical 
probability distributions at that time. 
If R(t, w, w’) then fir’(X) = p;(X) 
Proof. 
1. &(Ry’) >0 (C2), (C7) 
2. ~~(R~‘) =&(X 1 Rf) Modus Ponens: (C6), 1 
3. ,$‘(X / Rf) =p;(X 1 RP) (C2) 
4. ,u;(Rr) = 1 Meta-Theorem 2 
5. p:‘(x) = p:(x) definition of conditional probability. 
The following constraint on actions performs two functions. First, it enforces the 
desired temporal relation between generative and generated event tokens. Second, it 
guarantees that actions can actually occur, by requiring that the generative and generated 
event tokens of an action token occur in the same world-histo~. 
(C8) If act E ACTS and ((tr , t.~), WI} = gen(act) and ((~3, rq), wa) = Gen(act) 
then tl = tg, t2 < t4, and WI = ~2. 
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3.2.2. Semantic definitions 
Given the models described above, the semantic definitions for the well-formed for- 
mulas can now be defined. Denotations are assigned to expressions relative to a model, 
a world-history within the model, and an assignment of individuals in the domain to 
variables. The denotation of an expression 4 relative to a model M and a world-history 
w, and a variable assignment g is designated by [[q!~]~“““. The variable assignment func- 
tion g maps each temporal and probability variable to a real number and each object 
variable to a domain individual. In the definitions below, the expression g[ d/z ] denotes 
the assignm’ent of values to variables that is identical to assignment g with the possible 
exception that element d is assigned to variable z. The semantic definitions for the well- 
formed formulas are given below. The definitions specify the conditions under which 
sentences are assigned the value true. Since we have a two-valued logic, if a sentence 
is not true it is false. 
( 1) If M is a variable then [[u]~,“*~ =g(u) . 
(2) If G( is a non-logical constant then [cz]~~“‘,” = F(cr). 
(3) If7=f(WWq,... , trrn,) is a o-term, t-term, or p-term then 
urn JWW = ufn”,““( [Itrm,JJ”‘W’fi,. . . , [trm,]M*“*g), 
(4) [trmj < trm2Jj”+sg = true iff [trmljjM+‘,g < [tmt2jpw5 
(5) [[trrrt~ = tm2jM+.” = true iff [trmljM*W,g = pm2jpW,g. 
(6) [HOLDS(rf(trm~,...,trm,),ttrm~,ttrm;!)] M*w’R = true iff 
( ( nttm, 1 M,*b’,g , l[ttrm2nM+“g), W) E 
F(ti (Utr4ll 
M.w.x , . . . , [trmn]M*W~g). 
(7) [OCCURS( re( trml , . . . , trm,) , ttrml , ttrm2)]“‘“vK = true iff 
((ptnn,py uttm2pwy, W) E e 
for some e E F( re) ( [trml]M*wvR,. . , pTmnnM+,q. 
(8) [A7T( ra( trml , . . . , trm,), ttrml )I]“*“” = true iff 
3act E F(ra) ( [trml]M’W*R,. . . , utnn,jpy 
such that 3tgen(act) = (([Ittrml]“‘“‘R,t),~). 
(9) [0CC(ra(trm~,...,trm,),ttrm~,ttrm2)] M’w’fZ =true iff 
hct E F( ra) ( [trm, j”+,R, . , . , Utrmn]M*“‘g) 
such that 3 gen(act) = (([ttrml]“*“TK, t), W) 
and Gen( act) = (([to-m, JjMs”‘*#, [ttm2]Mg”*R), w). 
( IO) u+n”,“vg = true iff ~~~~~~~~ $ true. 
( 1 1) [I& A &]“+‘,” = true iff [[&n”+,’ = true and [&]“+‘VK = true. 
(12) I[V~ +I”+” = true iff z E V and [+]“+‘VR’d’Z1 = true for all d E D or z, E 
7’V U PV and [[4] M’w’R’d’z  = true for all d E JR. 
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now lob 11:oo ncon 3:oo 5:OO 
Fig. 6. Model for train crash example. 
( I 3) [II,‘, ( +)jM9”” = true iff [+Jj M’W”R = true for every w’ such that 
R( [ttrWzjj”‘W”fi, w, w’). 
( 14) UP,,, ($9 I] M+‘Sfi =$,mlM,“.S ( { W’ E R;,mlM.W,8 : u+n Mdg = true) > . 
The logical operators V, +, and 3 are defined in terms of 1, A, and V in the usual 
way. The numeric relations <, =, 2, > are defined in terms of <, e.g., 
(A < B) = +B < A). 
Possibility 0 is defined in terms of inevitability as Ot( 4) E 1 Cl, (-4). The interesting 
definitions are the last two. Definition ( 13) says that a sentence is inevitable in a world 
w at a time t iff it is true in all worlds indistinguishable from w up to and including 
time t. Definition (14) says that the probability of a sentence 4 in a world w at a time 
t is the probability of those accessible worlds in which q?~ is true. 
A sentence 4 is satisfied by a model M at a world w if it is assigned the value true 
by that model and world. A sentence is valid if it is satisfied by every model at every 
world. The value assignment g is irrelevant to the truth value of a sentence since by 
definition sentences contain no free variables. 
3.3. Example 
To illustrate the correspondence between the syntax and semantics of C,, we show a 
possible model for one of the example sentences presented earlier: 
l There is a 50% chance that by noon a train crash will inevitably occur between 
3:00 and 5:OO. 
~now(~t1 (fl < noon)/\ 
cl,, (3t2, tg (3:OO < t2 < t3 < TOO) A 
OCCURS(crash(train), t2, tg))) = 0.5. 
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One possible model for this sentence is shown in Fig. 6. The sentence is not satisfied 
in world wa since there the chance that a crash between 390 and 5:00 is inevitable by 
noon is one. The sentence is satisfied in worlds WI-W-]. In worlds WI and wz a crash 
between 3:00 and 5:00 is inevitable at 10:OOam. In each of the worlds ws-ws a crash 
between 3:00 and 5:OO is inevitable at 1l:OOam. The chance of worlds WI-wg is 50%. 
In worlds wf, and w7 a crash is inevitable but it does not necessarily occur between 3:00 
and 5:O0. In worlds WI-w7 there is a 70% chance of a crash occurring between 3:00 
and 5:O0. This is higher than the chance of a crash inevitably occurring between 3:00 
and 5:O0. Notice that it follows from the above logical sentence that there is at least a 
50% chance an agent controlling the train can do nothing to avoid a crash after noon. 
4. Proof theory 
In this section we present a partial axiomatization for Lt,,. We then use the axioma- 
tization to prove numerous theorems that illustrate properties of the logic and that will 
be useful later in reasoning about actions and plans. In addition to facilitating reasoning 
with the logic, the axioms and theorems presented in this section show that the con- 
straints imposed on the models in Section 3 are sufficient to capture the desired intuitive 
properties described in the ontology. 
Before presenting the axioms we first note that C rca is not completely axiomatizable. 
This fact fallows from a result due to Halpern [26]. Halpern presents a first-order 
probability logic Cz that allows quantification over real probability values and domain 
individuals. The language of Cz is that of ordinary first-order logic with the addition 
of the probability operator P. Probability in models for 132 is defined in terms of a 
single distribution over possible worlds. Halpern shows that the valid formulas of Cz 
are not recursively enumerable and hence the logic is not completely axiomatizable. The 
argument that this entails the non-axiomatizability of L,,, is given below. 
Sentences of C2 can be translated to sentences of C,, as follows. Halpern’s P operator 
is translated as a probability at a given fixed time, say to: Pt,. All atomic formulas 
are translated as instantaneous facts at that same fixed time, e.g., on(A, B) becomes 
HOLDS( on t: A, B) , to, to). So, for example, the C2 sentence 
‘dxP(flyQ(x,y) A P(Vz R(z)) =0.7) =0.2 
would be translated as 
VxP,,(3yHOLDS(Q(x,y),to,to) A Pt,(VzHOLDS(R(z),to,to)) =0.7) =0.2. 
Now an J&., sentence which is a translation of an Lz sentence is valid in our logic if 
and only if the corresponding Cz sentence is valid in Halpem’s logic. So if the valid 
formulas of Le, were recursively enumerable so would be the valid formulas of Cz. 
Since the valid formulas of L:2 are not recursively enumerable, the valid formulas of 
L,,, cannot be either. Hence L,, is not completely axiomatizable. 
The lack of existence of a complete axiomatization for L,, is not seen as a serious 
drawback for two reasons. First, the logic is intended to be used in the design and 
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analysis of planning algorithms that are sound with respect to the logic and possibly 
complete with respect to a subset of the logic. Second, a sound set of axioms and 
rules of inference are provided that are rich enough to allow us to make all inferences 
considered in this paper. 
4.1. Axioms 
The axioms presented below are divided into classes. First there are six basic classes 
describing six types of reasoning: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
first-order axioms with equality and the rules of Modus Ponens and Universal 
Generalization to describe first-order logical reasoning, 
axioms of real closed fields to describe numeric reasoning, 
S5 axioms and the rule of necessitation for reasoning about inevitability, 
probability axioms and the rule of probability of logical equivalents to describe 
probabilistic reasoning, 
(5) temporal logic axioms to describe temporal reasoning, and 
(6) an action axiom for reasoning about action. 
Following these are three sets of axioms that relate some of the basic classes: 
l the inevitability and equality axiom, 
l axioms describing the temporal properties of inevitability, and 
l axioms relating inevitability and probability. 
Subsets of the axioms have appeared elsewhere in the literature as parts of axiomati- 
zations of other logics. The first-order axioms and rules of inference are taken from 
[ 30, Chapter 11 and appear originally in [ 631. The S5 axioms and rule of necessitation 
are taken from [30, Chapter 31. The S5 axioms, the rule of necessitation, axiom IE, 
and axioms ITI-IT4 are part of the axiomatization of Pelavin’s [43] planning logic. 
The field axioms and the probability axioms Pl, P2, and PE have appeared as parts of 
the axiomatization of the probability logics in [ 171 and [ 31, The field axioms appear 
originally in [49]. Soundness proofs for the less commonly known axioms are given in 
the appendix. 
First-order axioms with equality 
FOLl. (t$v$) -4. 
FOL2. cc, -+ (q!~ v@). 
FOL3. (4 v $) --+ (@ v 4). 
FOL4. (fi -Y) -+ ((+V+) --f (+VY)). 
FOL5. ‘dx+ -+ qS(x/tm), where trm is substitutable5 for x in 4. 
s Roughly, trm is substitutable for x in C$ if 4 does not contain a quantifier that could capture trm. 
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EQl. trm = trm, where trm is any term. 
263 
EQ2. (trml = trm2) + (4 -+ 4’)) where C$ is atomic and q5’ is obtained by replacing 
trml in zero or more places by trm2. 
First-order rules of inference 
MoPo. Modus Ponens: From q5 and q3 + $ infer 4. 
UG. Universal Generalization: From C$ 4 J+ infer 4 --+ Vx@, where x does not occur 
free in ~5. 
Axioms of real closed fields 
These axioms capture numeric reasoning over the reals. The variables range over time 
points and probability values. 
F-1. V’xyz ((x+y)+Z =X+(Y+z))* 
F2. V’x(x t 0 =x). 
F3. Vx (x-k (-1 .x) =O). 
F4. tlxy (x+y=y+x). 
F5. Vxyz ((x.y).z=x.(y.z)). 
F6. vx (x. 1 =x). 
F7. Vx (x ~$0 -+ 3y(x.y = 1)). 
F8. ‘dxy (x.y=y.x). 
F9. Vxyz (x.(y+z) =(X*Y)+(x’z)). 
FlO. 0 # 1. 
Fll. Vx (-1(x < x)). 
F12. b’xyz ((X<Y)Ao’<Z) --+(x<z))* 
F13. Vxy ((x < y) V (x = y) V (y < x)). 
F14. Vxyz ((x<y) -((x+z) <(Y+Z)))- 
F15. Vxy (((O<x)A(O<y))+(O<x.Y)). 
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F16. vx ((O<x) +Ely(y.y=x)). 
F17. Every polynomial of odd degree has a root, e.g., the axiom for a polynomial of 
degree 3 is 
S5 axioms 
These axioms capture the fact that for a fixed time, inevitability is an S5 type modal 
operator. 
Il. q ,c$ -+ c#A 
14. O,$ -+ q ,O,+. 
Rule of necessitation 
NEC. From 4 conclude 0‘4. 
Probability axioms 
These axioms capture the probabilistic component of the logic. The first two axioms 
describe probability at a fixed time, while the third axiom describes the behavior of 
probability over time. 
Pl. Non-negativity: P!(4) 2 0. 
P2. Additivity: P,(4) = P,(qb A @) + P,(+ A -@). 
P3. Miller’s principle: (ti < t2) -+ P,,(r$ 1 P,,($) 3 a) 2 a. 
Axioms Pl and P2 are variants of two of the three well-known axioms of probability 
[33]. As mentioned earlier, variants of these axioms have appeared in [ 171 and [3]. 
Those axiomatizations also contain the third axiom of probability, represented by Fagin 
et al. as P,( true) = 1 and by Bacchus as P,(4) + P,(+) = 1. These axioms follow in 
our logic as a consequence of other axioms describing inevitability and probability. The 
validity of the third axiom of probability is proven as Theorem 7 in the next section. 
Axiom P3 is called Miller’s principle and several nontemporal variants of it were first 
suggested by Brian Skyrms [52] as possible constraints on higher-order probabilities. 
Miller’s principle is useful for two reasons. First, it formalizes our intuitions about the 
relation between chance at various times. For example, suppose that I have two coins, 
one fair coin and one with a 70% chance of heads and that I am going to choose one 
coin and flip it. What is the chance now of heads given that I will choose the biased 
P Huddawy/Artijicial Intelligence 80 (1996) 243-308 265 
coin? By intuition and Miller’s principle it is 70%. Notice that, as Skyrms [ 52, Appendix 
21 has pointed out, if we have a sentence in the language corresponding to the-biased- 
coin-is-chosen and appropriate conditional probabilities we can always represent such 
higher-order probability statements with simple probabilities. But we may not always 
have such fsentences readily available. 
The second useful consequence of Miller’s principle is that it allows the current 
chance of facts and events to be inferred from the chances of their future chances: the 
probability at a given time is the expected value of the probability at any future time. 
Suppose I am going to choose at random between the two coins above. There is a 50% 
chance that the chosen coin will have a 70% chance of landing heads and a 50% chance 
that the coin will have a 50% chance of landing heads. By Miller’s principle, it follows 
that there is now a 60% chance that the coin flip will result in heads. 
Probabilio of logical equivalents rule 
This inference rule is valid since if two sentences are logically equivalent then they 
hold in exactly the same possible worlds. 
PE. From 4 c-t I/, infer P,(4) = PI(@). 
Temporal logic axioms 
These axioms capture the temporal component of the logic. No specific temporal 
axioms are needed for reasoning about relations among time intervals since this is 
captured by the field axioms above. 
TLl. Facts; hold over their subintervals, except possibly at the endpoints. 
(tlQt2Qtl~t4)A(tl#t3)A(t2#t4)~ 
[H#OLDS(FA,tl,ta) +HOLDS(FA,t:!,tj)]. 
TL2. HOLDS(FA,tl,t;!) + (tl < t2). 
TL3. OCCURS(EV, cl, t2) -+ (tl < t2). 
TL4. OCC(A,tl,tz) --f (tl < t2). 
Action axiom 
This axi’om is valid since OCC is true iff both the generative and generated event 
tokens of the action occur, while ATT is true iff the generative event token occurs. 
ACTl. OCC(A, tA, t’.J ---f AZ7’(A, tA). 
Inevitability and equality axiom 
This axiom is valid because the interpretation of the equality predicate is rigid across 
worlds. 
IE. Equality is inevitable: Of(trml = trmz) -+ q ,(trml = trmz). 
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Inevitability temporal axioms 
This set of axioms relates the inevitability operator and the temporal component of 
the logic. The first axiom is valid since the set of accessible worlds becomes smaller as 
we move into the future. The second axiom is valid since the interpretation of relations 
among time points is rigid. The remaining axioms capture the intuitive property that 
the present and past are determined. They are valid since the inevitability operator is 
defined over worlds that are indistinguishable up to and including a given time. 
ITl. Inevitability persists. 
(?I < t2) + (Q,dJ -+ Q,4J). 
IT2. Temporal relations are inevitable. 
Ot(ll < t2) --$ q (tl < t2). 
IT3. Present and past facts are inevitable. 
(II < t2) --+ [ q ,,HULDS(FA, to, tl > V q ,,+ZOLDS(FA, to, tj ) I. 
IT4. Present and past events are inevitable. 
(t, < t2) -+ [ci,,OCCUl?Is(EV,to,t,) vO,*lOCCURS(EYto,tl)]. 
ITS. Present and past action occurrences are inevitable. 
(tl < t2) --t [O,,OCC(A,to,tl) V0,2+CC(A,to,t1)l. 
IT6. Present and past action attempts are inevitable. 
(to < tl) --+ [O,,AWA, to> V q ,,lAWA, to)]. 
Axioms relating inevitability and probability 
IPl. Inevitability implies certainty: q & ---f P,( 4) = 1. 
IP2. Current chance is inevitable: 01[ Pt( 4) 2 cr] + 0, [ P,( 4) > a]. 
4.2. Theorems 
In this section we present theorems that will either be useful later or help to illustrate 
properties of the logic. For illustrative purposes, we provide proofs of a few of the less 
obvious theorems. Proofs are presented in two-column format with the justifying axiom 
or inference rule in the right column. A reference to an inference rule is followed by 
a list of the axioms and/or steps to which the rule was applied. We first present two 
theorems that will be used in later derivations. 
Theorem 4. From cf~ -+ $ and @ + y infer q5 -t y. 
Theorem 5. 4 --+ O,q5. 
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4.2.1. Field theorems 
We show the derivation of the following simple theorem to illustrate the use of the 
field and e’quality axioms. Henceforth we will simply cite the field and equality axioms 
to justify multiple derivation steps using them. 
Theorem ii. (trml = trm2 + s - s) --+ (ttml = trm2). 
Proof. 
1. s+(-1 *S) =o F3 
2. [s+ (-1 .S) =O] + 
[(tm =trm+s-s) +(trml =trm;!+O)] EQ2 
3. (trml = trm2 +s - s) + (trml = trm2 +0) MoPo: I, 2 
4. trm2 + 0 = trm2 F2 
5. [trW+O=trm:!l + [(trml =trm2+0) + (trm, =trm2)] EQ2 
6. (trml = trm2 + 0) -+ (trml = trm2) MoPo: 4, 5 
7. (trml = trm2 + s - s) --f (trml = trm2) MoPo: 3, 6 
4.2.2. Probability theorems 
If we think of probability one as analogous to inevitability and probability greater 
than zero as analogous to possibility, then several of the theorems in this section can be 
seen as probabilistic analogues of theorems describing inevitability and possibility. 
Theorem ‘1. From q5 infer P, (4) = 1. 
This is the third Kolmogorov axiom of probability mentioned above. It follows from 
properties ‘of inevitability and the relation between probability and inevitability: 
Proof. 
I. qi Hypothesis 
2. Cl& NEC 
3. El,4 + Pt(Cj> = 1 IPl 
4. F;(4) = 1 MoPo. 
Theorem 8. P,(4) + P,(+) = 1. 
Theorem !L P,(q5 V qb/> = P[(+) + Pt(@) - Pr(d A 9). 
Theorem IO. Stronger sentences have lower probability. From C$ -+ fi infer P, ($) < 
Pt($)* 
Theorem Il. P,(4) = 1 + P,(4A+) = P,(e). 
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Theorem 12. Chance is the expected value offuture chance. 
(tl < t2) -+ [P,,(P,?(4) 2 a) 2 P -+ Pt,(d) a a.Pl 
Proof. 
P3 
P2 
definition of c-prob: 2 
[Pt,(Pt,(4) 3 a) 3 P --+ 
Pr, (4) > LY . p + P,, ( C#J A -Pt2 (4) 2 a) ] Field axioms, EQ2: 1, 3 
5. (tl < t2) -+ 
[Pt,(Pt*(4) > a) > P + P,,(4) a a-PI Field axioms 
Theorem 13. Certainly later certainty implies truth. 
(tl 6 t2) + Pt,(P,z(4J) = 1 + 4) = 1. 
This is the probabilistic analogue of axiom II. 
Proof. 
1. (tl < t2) + pt,c+ I Pt,(4> = 1) = 1 P3 
2. (fl < t2) + 
P,, (4 A Pr2 ( 4) = 1) = P,, ( Pf2 (#) = 1) definition of c-prob 
Let A E q3 and B = Pf2 (4) = 1. Then 
3. (tl < t2) -+ P,, (A A B) = P,,(B) 
4. P,,(B+A)=P,,(dl)+Pt,(A)-P,,(d?AA) Theorem 9 
5. Pt,(B-+A)=l-P,,(B)+P,,(A)-P,,(GJAA) Theorem8 
6. (tl < t2) -+ 
P,,(B ---f A) = 
1 -P,,(AAB) +Pt,(A) -P,,(+AA) EQ2: 3, 5 
7. (tl < t2) ----t Pt,(B + A) = 1 - P,,(A) + P,,(A) F’Z EQ2 
8. (tl < t2) + P,,(B + A) = 1 Theorem 6 
9. cti < t2) ---) P,,(P,,(4) = 1 + 4) = 1 substituting back 
Theorem 14. Certainty certainly persists. 
(to G tl G t2) -+ P,“(P,,($) = 1 + P,*(4) = 1) = 1. 
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This is the probabilistic analogue of axiom ITl. Note that it is not valid that certainty 
simply persists since semantic constraint (C6) only applies to equivalence classes of 
worlds of positive probability. 
Theorem 15. Facts have higher chance of holding over their subintervals. 
(tl < t2 6 t3 G t4) A (t1 $h) A (tt $t4) --+ 
P,(HOLDS(FA,t;!,t3)) 2 P,(HOLDS(FA,tl,t4)). 
4.2.3. Inevitability of the past 
Theorem 116. Possibility persists into the past. 
(t1 < 1’2) -+ CO& -+ 0,,+1. 
Theorem 17. Present and past inevitability are inevitable. 
(tl < (12) + (O,, Q, (b + Q, a,, 4). 
Theorem 18. Present and past possibility are inevitable. 
(t1 G l2) -+ CO,, o,, 4 -+ at, o,, 4). 
Theorem 19. Present and past chance are inevitable. 
Proof. 
I. (II < t2) -+ OtJ't,(4) 2 a -+ Ot,Pt,(4,) 3 a '&m-em 16 
2. Or,P,,(4> 2 a -+ q t,Pt,(#J) 2 a! IP2 
3. (II 6 t2) -+ Q,P,,(#) > cy -+ &P,,(4) 3 a IT1 
4. (II < t2) --+ O,zP,,(+) k cr -+ &P,,(4) > (Y Theorem 4: l-3 
4.2.4. Certainty of the present and past 
By axiom IPl that inevitability implies certainty, the following theorems that the past 
is certain follow directly from the corresponding axioms and theorems for inevitability. 
Theorem Z!O. Present and past facts are certain. 
(t, < t2) -+ [P,,(HOLDS(FA,to,tl)) = 1 v P,,(HOLDS(FA,to,t,)) =O]. 
Similar theorems hold for OCCURS, OCC, and ATT. 
Theorem ;!l. Present and past inevitability is certain. 
(tl G t2) ---) (P,,(Q,+) > 0 4 P,,(Q,#) = 1). 
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Theorem 22. Present and past possibility is certain. 
(tl G t2) -+ (pt,(ot,+s) > 0 --f Pf?(Ol,$) = 1). 
Theorem 23. Present and past chance is certain. 
(tl < 12) + (P,?(P,,($) z a> > 0 + Pt,(Pt,(4) > a> = 1). 
4.2.5. Modal operators and quantijers 
The following theorems capture the relationships between the quantifiers and the 
modal operators. These theorems hold because the domain of individuals does not vary 
from world to world. 
Theorem 24 (Barcan formula). 
Vx 0, 4 --f QV’x$, where x does not occur free in t. 
Theorem 25 (Converse Barcan formula). 
q ,Vx$ -+ Yx Cl, 4, where x does not occur free in t. 
Theorem 26 (Probabilistic converse Barcan formula). 
P,(Vn4> = CY + VxP,(Cp) b a. 
Proof. 
I. ‘Jxr$+cp FOL4 
2. P,(Vx# + 4) = 1 Theorem 7 
3. P,(Vx$ --t 4) = 1 + Pt(+ AVx4) = cy Theorem 11 
4. P,(f)bAVx$b) =a MoPo: 2, 3 
5. P,(4) B a Theorem 10 
Note that the probabilistic analogue of the Barcan formula 
vx P,(4) = 1 ---f P,(Vx 4) = 1 
is not valid because the antecedent can be satisfied by a model in which each x is true 
in almost all worlds. 
4.2.6. Actions 
Theorem 27. Attempted acts are feasible. 6 
ATT(A,tA) -+ FEAS(A,t*). 
6 The definition of feasibility is given in Section 5.1 
t? Huddawy/Artifiog6) 243-308 271 
Proof. 
I. AZYA, fA) - O,,ATT(A. t, Theorem 5 
2. (t G TV) + (O,,A~(A,~A)) Theorem 16 
3. vt (t < tA) - (Ot,&TA,~A)) UG 
4. vt of,, An(A.tA) + l(t d tA) ] FOL axioms 
5. ATT(A,tA) - [vl (t d IA) FOL axioms, MoPo 
6. ATT(A, tA) - FEAS(A, tA) definition of FEAS 
Theorem 28. Past and presenf feasiE 
(tA < t) - COPEAS(A,tA) - [. 
4.3. Examples 
In this Se&On two Shpk exampkSl]uStr~te the use of the logic in 
reasoning about actions. The first eXmElogiC Cm be uSed to distinguish 
between factors that an agent cannot &ey are inevitable and factors 
the agent cannot influence because thekndent of his available actions. 
Consider a game in which balls are t Suppose that at time tl you 
will randomly be given one of three tning two Urns_ In box 1 both 
urns contain all red balls. In box 2 thh r& and white balls and the 
proportions in the two urns are identica, contains all red balls and the 
other contains all white balls. At time lose one of the urns from the 
box you are given and give the urn to me ts she is then to choose a 
ball at random from that urn. What is tl can influence the chance that 
she will draw a red ball? The situation ,y the fOIlowing Sentences: 
(now<t, <t2<tg<tq), (11 
P,,ow (Q, OCCUZW red-picked, t3, (21 
Pn,,,u ( P,, ( OCCUFW red-picked, t3, 
Vx Pf2 ( OCCURS( red-picked:k( X), t2, t3 ) ) = 
PI2 ( OCCURS( red-picked (3) 
One model in which these sentences are,rlds is shown in Fig_ 7. 
Since inevitability persists (axiom IT1 tences have lower probability 
(Theorem 10) it follows from sentence 
P,,,,w (Cl,, OCCURS{ red-picked, t3, t4 (4) 
Since Inevitability implies certainty (axis from (4) that 
P,,, ( Pt2 ( OCCUZ?S( red-picked, t3, t4 (5) 
By Theorem 11, 
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Red 
Fig. 7. Possiblh. 
Prz (OCCVRS( red-picked, t3, t4) ) 
P,, (OCCVRS( red-picked, t3, t,p t2 3 t3 ) > = 
Pt,(OCC(pick(x),tz,ts)). 
By inference rule UG and Theorem 7 I) that 
(6) 
P,,,,( Pt2 (OCCVRS( red-picked, tz 
‘dx Pt2 (OCCVRS(red-pickpick t t2, t3) ) = 
P,,(OCC(pick(x),t:!,t, 
Theorem 11 applied to (5) and (7) y 
P,,,,w ( PI2 ( OCCVRS( red-picked, t 
‘dx P,? ( OCCVRS( red-pickIPick( x ), t2 7 t3 ) ) = 
Pt,(OCC(pick(x),t2,~ 
And by the definition of conditional 1 
(7) 
(8) 
P,,,,,,( Pt, (OCCVRS( red-picked, i 
Vx P,> ( OCCVRS( red-picl/Pick(x) 9 t2 1 t3 > ) = 
Ptz (OCCVRS( red-pi&. (9) 
Finally by axiom ~2, sentences (3) Cnbined to yield 
P,,,,,,,(~x P,? (OCCVRS( red-picyick(x) v t2, t3 ) ) = 
Pt2 (OCCVRS( red-pi& (10) 
SO there is at most a l/3 chance $nce the chance of your partner 
picking a red ball. 
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1 HOLDS(icy,tl,$) 
I I 
I . 
5 i -HOLDS(icy,tt,t3) 
: : 
I I 
: : 
I I I I 
I 
“ObV t1 tz b 
Fig. 8. Possible model for carry example. 
The next example is a modified version of an example presented by Pelavin [43]. It 
illustrates how the ability of the logic to represent both probability and possibility can be 
used to reason about the chance that two actions can co-occur. Suppose that I am going 
shopping this evening and want to carry two grocery bags to the car simultaneously. In 
most cases it is not possible to carry two bags if it is icy out. There is a 50% chance that 
it will be icy out this evening. What is the chance that carrying both bags simultaneously 
will not be a possible course of action? The situation can be described by the following 
three sentences. In these sentences, the terms now, tt, t2, and tg are time constants. 
vt,t’ (now< t < t’) ---f 
P,,d~O, [OCC(caq(h),t,t’) AOCC(carry(b2),t,t’)l I 
HOLDS(icy, t, t’) ) = 0.8, (11) 
p,,,,(HOLDS(icy,tl,t3)) = 0.5, (12) 
(now < t1 < t:! < t3). (13) 
We would like to know the probability of 
~0,~ [OCC(caq(h),tl,t:!) AOCC(CW(~~),~I,~~)I. 
One possible model in which the sentences are satisfied in every world is shown in 
Fig. 8. The labels “CO” and “-CO” designate the co-occurrence and non-co-occurrence 
of the two actions, respectively. Note that in worlds wt-w4 we have 
~0,~ [OCC(cq4h),t19t2) ~OCC(carry(b~),t~,t;!)l 
and in ws and +j we have 
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The property that facts have higher chance of holding over their subintervals (Theo- 
rem 14) together with sentences ( 12) and ( 13) entail that 
P,,,,,,(HOLNicy, r~, f2)) 3 0.5. (14) 
By axioms FOL5 and MoPo it follows from sentences (11) and (13) that 
P,,,,w(~0,, [~wc~y(h~,tl,t2) ~OCC(carry(b:!),tl,t2)1 1 
HOLDS( icy,tt ,t2)) = 0.8. 
By axiom P2 it follows from sentences (14) and (15) that 
~now(~Or, [OCC(carqf(h),h,t2) A OCC(carry(b2),21,t2)1) 2 0.4. 
So there is at least a 40% chance that carrying both bags simultaneously will not be 
possible. 
Furthermore, an upper bound on the current probability of the co-occurrence of the 
two actions can be calculated. Since inevitability implies certainty (axiom IPl), 
Pnow(Pr,(OCC(carry(bl),tl,t2)) AOCC(carry(b2),tl,t2)) =O) 3 0.4 
and since chance is the expected value of future chance (Theorem 12)) 
5. Describing properties of actions 
The representation of actions contained in our logic is highly expressive. We can 
describe actions in terms of whether they can be attempted, whether their attempt will 
bring about their occurrence, and what effects their attempts and occurrences will have. 
This next section details how actions can be described. 
If an action can be attempted we say it is feasible. If an action occurs when attempted, 
we say that the action is executable. If an action influences the chance of certain 
conditions, we call these its effects. An action will be described in terms of its feasibility, 
its executability, and its effects. 
Conditions in the world may influence the chance that an action can be attempted. 
For example, I can only attempt to start my car if I am at the location of the car. Such 
conditions are called feasibility conditions. Further conditions may influence the chance 
that the action will occur. For example, if I attempt to start my car I will succeed 
in starting it only if there is gas in the tank. Such conditions are called executability 
conditions. And finally conditions may influence the chance that an action will achieve 
certain effects. For example, if I start my car with the garage door closed there is a good 
chance that I will be asphyxiated. Such conditions are called ramification conditions. 
The following three sections discuss how C tCa can be used to describe these different 
aspects of actions. 
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5.1. Feasibility 
Sometimes it may not be possible to attempt an action. This is the case if an action’s 
generative event cannot always occur. If it is not possible to attempt an action, we say 
that the a&on is infeasible. Three types of infeasibility can be distinguished. 
( 1) It rnay not be possible to attempt a single action under certain conditions: I 
cannot attempt to go from home to the office if I am not at home. 
(2) It rnay not be possible to attempt a compound action consisting to two con- 
current actions under certain conditions: ’ I cannot attempt to drive north and 
drive in the direction of the wind at the same time unless the wind is blowing 
north. 
(3) A compound action consisting to two concurrent actions may not be possible to 
attempt under any circumstances: I cannot attempt to raise and lower my left 
arm1 simultaneously under any conditions. 
If an action can be attempted we say that it is feasible. 
The attampt of an action is something the agent chooses to do. As long as an action’s 
generative event is consistent with the state of affairs of the world, the agent can 
choose to attempt the action and, hence, the action is feasible. We make the simplifying 
assumption that an action token’s generative event token is instantaneous. ’ 7 9 Since the 
agent may or may not choose to attempt an action, for an action to be feasible under this 
assumption it suffices that there be some action token whose generative event token is 
possible at an infinitesimal instant before the time of the event token. Since possibility 
persists into the past (Theorem 16) this can be captured by defining feasibility as 
possibility at all times before the time of the attempt: 
Definition 29. An action A is feasible at a time tA, written FEAS(A, tA) iff 
v(t < tA) O,An(A,tA). 
This definition of feasibility seems a bit complex and two simpler alternative defini- 
tions come to mind more immediately. First, one might be tempted to define feasibility 
’ One could make the assumption that individual actions are always feasible but, as this example shows, 
once we compose actions into plans we run into the problem that the plans may not be feasible. So we may 
as well be completely general and not assume individual actions to be feasible. 
’ We can think of a generative event token that spans time tA rk as a set of sequential instantaneous actions 
A;. An action is then feasible if each part of the action attempt is feasible in the context of the earlier parts 
of the action attempt. The chance of feasibility can be represented as 
where ATT( Pl.T-,n, 1A ) designates the occurrence of the portion of the generative event token from time tA 
up to time n. 
‘) Notice that had we only represented action occurrences and not attempts, we would have been forced to 
apply this assumption to occurrences with the result that we could not reason about actions that span time. 
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Fig. 9. Chance of feasibility. 
more simply as the possibility of the attempt at the time of the attempt: O,,ATT( A, tA). 
But because the past and present are inevitable (axiom IT6) it follows from this that 
q l,,AV(A, tA) and this is far too strong a condition for feasibility. Second, within 
a probabilistic framework, a more natural definition of feasibility might seem to be 
V( 2 < tA) P,(AZT( A, tA)) > 0. But this definition is too restrictive. In particular, it 
would rule out models which contain a uniform distribution over an uncountably infinite 
number of worlds and in which the action is attempted in only a finite number of the 
worlds. In such models, the probability of attempting the action would be zero, yet it 
would be possible to attempt the action. 
In general, there will be a certain chance that an action is feasible-the chance that 
conditions in the world are consistent with the occurrence of the generative event. The 
chance at time t that an action A is feasible at time tA is P,(F’EAS( A, tA)). 
Consider again the action of starting my car and suppose that the chance that it is 
feasible is 0.8, i.e., P,,,,(FEAS(start-car, tA)) = 0.8. One possible model for this is 
shown in Fig. 9. In neither world wt nor world w2 does the generative event of turning 
the key occur. So in both WI and w2 we have +EAS(start-car, tA). But in worlds 
ws-& the attempt is possible at time tA. So the chance that it will be within my power 
to choose to attempt the action is 80%. 
5.2. Executability 
Once an agent attempts an action, whether or not the action occurs is no longer 
directly within the agent’s control-it is a function of chance. 
Definition 30. The chance that an action A is executable at time tA is the chance that 
it occurs given that it is attempted: 
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5.3. Effects 
One of the objectives of the present work is to capture some of the natural relations 
that exist between actions and effects. We show how various kinds of effects can be 
described and how some natural properties of effects follow directly from the models of 
chance and possibility. 
An effect is a condition, the chance of which is influenced by an action. If an action 
increases the chance of a condition, it is called a positive efSect and if the action 
decreases the chance, it is called a negative effect. Depending on the nature of the 
planning problem, we may wish to describe effects in one of two ways. If we are not 
concerned about the occurrence of actions, we may simply describe effects of action 
attempts. In this case, the chance of the effect will be represented as 
P,(EFF 1 AZT(A, t,z,)). 
More expressive power can be gained by describing effects of action occurrences. In 
this case, we distinguish between effects of a successful action and effects of a failed 
action. The effects of an action’s occurrence are represented by an expression of the 
form 
and the effects of a failed action are represented as 
P,(EFFIATT(A,tA) A4t:,OCC(A,t,&). 
Three conditions are necessary for EFF to be a positive” effect of the occurrence 
of an act A: ” 
(i) Since actions can only influence the future, EFF cannot temporally precede 
the occurrence of A. But EFF need not necessarily completely succeed the 
occurrence of A. Fig. 10 shows the necessary temporal relation between action 
and effect. The possible temporal relations between actions and their effects that 
are allowed by this constraint are shown in Fig. 11. An effect may begin before 
the time of an action: the action of saying the word “seven” at the right time 
conu-ibutes to the effect of reciting the Gettysburg address. An effect may persist 
after the time of an action: the effect of the hockey puck sliding across the ice 
persists after the action of pushing it terminates. An effect may begin exactly 
once the action is over: the effect of the glass being empty begins exactly once 
all lthe water is poured out. An effect may end before the action is over: the 
effect of the box sliding across the floor ends once it hits the wall, even though 
the push action is still occurring. Finally, an effect may begin some time after 
an action is over: the effect of the bomb exploding occurs some time after the 
action of setting the timer. 
(ii) If an action has no chance of occurring at a particular time, it cannot have 
effects at that time. So A must have a positive chance of occurring. 
“’ Negative eflects are described similarly. 
’ ’ Note that these three conditions are similar to Suppes’ [ 54 1 prima facie causality conditions. 
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Fig. 10. Relative times of an action and its effect. 
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recite Gettysburg address 
I 
, push hockey puck , 
I 
puck slides across ice 
I 
I 
glass empty 
I 
box hits wall 
, set timeron bomb ,~ bombexplod~s , 
Fig. 1 I. Possible temporal relations between actions and effects. 
(iii) An effect is a condition influenced by an action, so the occurrence of A must 
positively influence the chance of EFF. 
These conditions are fundamental properties of effects of any kind-effects of actions, 
effects of events, even effects of facts. They will arise again in the discussion of 
conditions that influence actions since the feasibility, executability, and effects of actions 
are in a sense effects of such conditions. 
Suppose act A occurs in the interval tA to tA’ and let EFF be a fact, event, or action 
occurrence: HOLDS( H, tEFF, t&), occuRs(Ev, tEFF, t&F), of occ( A, t.WF, t&?) . 
Then the conditions (i)-(iii) can be stated in the logic as: 
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( 1) temporal non-succession: tA < t&, 
(2) positive chance of occurrence: PtA (OCC( A, tA, ta) ) > 0, I2 
( 3) positive inJ%dfluenCe: P,, (EFF 1 OCC( A, t,z, , tA’ ) ) > PfA (EFF) . 
Due to tlhe way the semantics of &, has been defined, condition (3) entails conditions 
( 1) and (2). If condition (3) is expanded out into its proper form in the logic it 
becomes: 
P,,(EFFAOCC(A,tA,t:,)) > P,,(EFF) -P,,(OCC(A,tA,t;)). 
If condition (2) is false, i.e., P,, (OCC(A, tA, ta)) = 0, then the above sentence is false 
since both sides of the inequality are zero. So if (3) holds, (2) must hold. Next, if ( 1) 
is false then t& < tA. Since the present and past are certain (Theorem 2O), 
P,, (EFF) = 0 v Pr, (EFF) = 1. 
Either case contradicts condition (3). So if (3) holds, (1) must also hold. 
This result shows that the models have captured the natural temporal relation between 
actions and effects-actions can only affect future conditions. As a consequence of this 
result, if we use condition (3) to define what is necessary for a plan to achieve a goal 
then actions after the time of the goal cannot contribute to achieving the goal. 
The ability of the logic to represent and distinguish between truth, probability, and 
possibility allows us to distinguish between potential effects and actual effects. We can 
define actual effects as potential effects that actually occur: 
EFF r\P,,(EFF 1 OCC(A,t,&) > P,,(EFF). 
5.4. Conditions that influence actions 
Conditions in the world may influence the feasibility, executability, and effects of 
actions. Such conditions are called feasibility conditions, executability conditions, and 
ramification conditions, respectively. In this section we present conditions, similar to 
those for effects, that are necessary for something to be a feasibility, executability, or 
ramification condition of an action. 
5.4.1. Feasibility conditions 
Certain conditions may influence the chance that an action will be feasible. If the 
conditions have a positive influence they are called positive feasibility conditions and 
otherwise they are called negative feasibility conditions. We discuss positive feasibility 
conditions here; negative feasibility conditions are similar. Let FC be a fact, event, or 
aCtiOn OCCllrrenCe: HOmS(m, tFC, t&), occuRs(Ev, tFC, t&>, Or OCC( A, tFc, t&) . 
As in our discussion of effects, three conditions are necessary for FC to be a positive 
feasibility condition for action A at time tA: 
I2 Note that this is equivalent to saying that the action has a positive chance of being executable, 
P,,, (OCC( A, tA, ?a) 1 A7T( A, tA)) > 0. The equivalence follows from the fact that f,,, (OCC( A, tA, la)) > 0 
entails that P,,, (ATT( A, IA)) > 0. 
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tFC t’Fc 
(1) temporal non-succession: t,CC < tA, 
(2) positive chance of the condition: PtFc (FC) > 0, 
(3) positive injkence: Pr,( FEAS(A, tA) 1 FC) > Pt,(FEAS(A, tA) ). 
Fig. 12. Relative times of feasibility condition and action attempt. 
The temporal non-succession condition rFc < tA is depicted in Fig. 12. 
As was the case for action effects, condition (3) entails both conditions (1) and (2). 
The argument that (3) entails (2) is exactly the same as for effects. The proof that (3) 
entails (1) is slightly more complicated. Suppose that condition (1) is false: 
1. (tA<tFC)--’ 
[O,,FEAS(A,tA) 4 Q,FEWA,tA)l Theorem 28 
2. P,,(FEAS(A, tA)) > 0 ---f O,,FEAS(A, t,z,) IPl 
3. &.&%‘tS(A, tA) + P,,(FE‘iS(A, tA)) = 1 IPl 
4. (tA < tFC) ---f [P,,(FEMA,tA)) > 0 + 
P,,(FEAS(A, tA)) = 11 Theorem 4: l-3 
5. (tA < tFC) + [P,,(FEAS(A,tA)) =ov 
P,,(FEAS(A,tA)) = 11 definition of +. 
Both P,,( FEAS( A, tA)) = 0 and P,,( FEAS( A, t.4)) = 1 contradict condition (3). So 
if (3) holds, ( 1) must hold. So again the models have captured a fundamental temporal 
relation: a condition that succeeds an action’s attempt cannot influence the feasibility of 
that action. 
5.4.2. Executability conditions 
Certain conditions may influence the chance that an action is executable. Conditions 
with a positive influence are called positive executability conditions and conditions with 
a negative influence are called negative xecutability conditions. Let EC be a fact, event, 
or action occurrence with associated interval tEc. the. Three conditions are necessary 
for EC to be a positive executability condition for action A at time tA: 
( 1) temporal non-succession: tEc < ta, 
(2) positive chance of attempt and condition: P,,(AZT(A, tA) A EC) > 0, 
(3) positive in.uence: 
P,,:,(OCC(A, tA, t;) 1 An(A, tA) A J=) > 
p,,;,(OCC(A,W;) lAn(A,ttt)). 
Negative executability conditions are represented by negating the occurrence of A. Once 
again, condition (3) entails both conditions (1) and (2). The proofs are similar to the 
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tEC t’J?c 
Fig. 13. Relative times of executability condition and action occurrence. 
earlier proofs showing that the effects of an action cannot occur prior to the time of the 
action. 
The temporal non-succession condition tEc < ta is depicted in Fig. 13. It just says 
that in order for EC to influence the success of A, it cannot be a constraint on the 
state of the world after the time of the action. This makes good intuitive sense because 
executability conditions should not just provide evidence for the executability of an 
action but they should influence the executability. Hence, they should be worth bringing 
about. For example, consider a condition after the time of the action that increases the 
chance now that the action will be executable. Suppose that typically 15 minutes after 
I start my car the engine is warm: 
P,,,,,I:OCC(start(car), TV, f2) I 
A7T( start( car), ti > A 
3t HOLDS( warm( engine( car) ), t:! + 15min, t) ) > 
P,,,,,,(OCC(start(car),ti,t2) 1 ATT(start(car),ti)). 
We would not want to call 3 HOLDS(warm(engine), t2 + lSmin, t) an executability 
condition for starting my car and to generate a plan to warm up my car in the future in 
order to make my car start now. 
5.4.3. Rami$cation conditions 
Certain conditions in the world may influence the chance of an action’s positive 
or negative effects. If the conditions have a positive influence on the effect, they are 
called pos,itive ramijcation conditions and otherwise they are called negative ramification 
conditions. In some cases a positive ramification condition may even turn a negative 
effect into a positive effect, and conversely for negative ramification conditions. Let 
RAM be a fact, event, or action occurrence with associated interval (tR*M, thM). Since 
we will primarily be concerned with the effects of the occurrences of successful actions, 
we will dIescribe ramification conditions within this context. The definitions for failed 
actions and for simple action attempts are similar. Three conditions are necessary for 
RAM to be a positive ramification condition with respect to effect EFF for action A at 
time tA: 
(1) Telmporal non-succession: tRAM < tkFF, 
(2) Positive chance of occurrence and condition: PfRA,( OCC( A, tA, ta) A RAM) > 0, 
(3) Positive injhence: 
P,,,,(EFF ) OCC(A, tA, t;) A RAM) > 
P,,,(EFFI OCC(A,~A,&)). 
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Fig. 14. Relative times an action, its effect, and ramification condition. 
Negative ramification conditions are represented by negating EFF. Once again, condition 
(3) entails both conditions ( 1) and (2). 
The temporal relations between the action, the effect, and the ramification condition 
are depicted in Fig. 14. The temporal non-succession condition just says that in order 
for RAM to influence EFF, it cannot be a constraint on the state of the world after 
the time of the effect. Note, however, that RAM can occur after the time of the action 
because the effect of the action can be delayed. 
5.5. Properties of plans 
In general we will be interested in reasoning about plans rather than single actions. 
A plan is simply a set of actions attempted at particular times. By specifying the times 
of the attempts within the plan, we can represent plans containing both sequential and 
concurrent actions in a homogeneous manner. To reason about plans, we will simply 
reason about the set of actions composing them. 
5.5.1. Feasibility of plans 
Plan feasibility is a more complex concept than action feasibility. Attempting a plan 
means attempting all the actions composing the plan, so a plan attempt is the conjunction 
of the individual action attempts. A plan is feasible if it can be attempted, i.e., if all the 
actions composing it can be attempted. We first examine two superficially appealing but 
incorrect ways of defining the chance of plan feasibility and then present a definition 
that has the desired properties. Consider the plan ATT( AI, t,+ ) AA7T( A2, t,+ ), with any 
ordering of the attempts. First, we might be tempted to define the chance that this plan 
is feasible simply as the chance that each action is feasible: 
But this expression gives us too high a chance for plan feasibility because the statement 
FEAS( Al, tA, ) A FEAS(A2, t,+) could be satisfied by a model in which each action is 
attempted in some world but there is no world where they are both attempted together. 
Second, by analogy to action feasibility we might be tempted to define the chance that 
the plan is feasible as 
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Fig. 15. Example of plan feasibility. 
If tA, = tA2 this is the correct expression for feasibility since the joint attempt of Al 
and A2 is equivalent to the attempt of the single more complex action. But suppose that 
tA, < t,+ and consider the model in Fig. 15. The chance of the above sentence is 0.8, 
but the chance that action AI is feasible is 0.8 while the chance that A2 is feasible given 
that Al is attempted is only 0.14. So the chance that the actions composing the plan 
can both be attempted is only 0.8 .0.14 = 0.11. Hence this expression also gives us too 
high a value for plan feasibility. 
Each action in a plan must be feasible in the context of the attempts of the earlier 
actions in the plan since we wish to attempt the entire plan. So the chance that the 
above plan is feasible is 
P,(F~~S(Az,t.+) 1 Ap(AI,tA,)) *P,(FEAS(AI,~A,)). 
If tA, = t,+ this is also a valid expression for plan feasibility. So when t.4, = t& we have 
Pr(FEAS(Az,tA,) 1 An(Al,tA,)) *&(FJ=%AI,~A,)) = 
P,(FE’AS({AI,A2},tA,)), 
where 
FEAS({At,Az},rA,) = 
vt (t ‘: tA,) -+ Or[An(AI,tA,) AA~(ht,+)l. 
Finally consider the plan AZT(Al, t,+) AA’IT(A2, t&) AAZT(A3, tA3), where rA, = tA2 < 
f&. The chance that this plan isfeasible is 
P,(=‘A%AS,tA,) 1 Am(AIvtA,) AAm(&,tAz)) 
.P~(~EAS(AZ,~A~) 1 An(Al,tA,)) *f’t(FEA%A~,ttt,)) 
or equivalently, 
Definition 31. In general, the chance that the plan consisting of the set of n action 
attetIIptS Al’T(Ai, t,+) with t,+ < t,.+ < . . . 6 tA,, iS feasible is 
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FEAS(Ai,fA,) 1 /\AZ’T(Aj,fAj) 
.jci 
5.5.2. Executability of plans 
The chance that a plan is executable is represented by an expression of the form 
\i i / 
Just as with individual actions, plans may have executability conditions. 
5.5.3. Effects of plans 
The chance of the effect of a successful plan is represented by an expression of the 
form 
Pt EFF 1 A OCC(Ai, tAi, tai) 
\ i / 
Effects of plan attempts and of failed plans are represented similarly. Just as with 
individual actions, plans may have ramification conditions. 
6. Describing and reasoning about planning problems 
In this section we present a general framework for describing planning problems. 
The purpose of the framework is to provide guidance in the use of the rich language 
C tea . The main purpose of describing planning problems is to use the description in 
the generation and evaluation of plans. So in developing the framework, we focus on 
descriptions that are compositional, in the sense that properties of a plan may be inferred 
from the properties of the component actions and the environment. We present one way 
in which Cc,,, can be used to specify such a description. Many alternatives are possible. 
6.1. Representing the planning problem 
In this section we show how C,,, can be used to describe planning problems so that 
we can reason about the chance that a plan will achieve a given goal. Since the best 
knowledge we have about chance is the chance now, in describing the planning prob- 
lem all probabilities will be taken relative to the present time. A planning problem is 
described in terms of (i) the planning environment, (ii) the individual action specifi- 
cations, (iii) the action interactions, and (iv) the goal description. Following Pelavin 
[ 431, we call the world within which planning takes place the planning environment. 
Since we are working in a temporal setting, the description of the planning environment 
can include chances of facts and events that hold or occur at any time. The individual 
action specifications describe feasibility conditions, executability conditions, and effects 
with associated ramification conditions for each action. Although in principle the goal 
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description may be any sentence of Ctca, in practice we restrict the goal description to be 
any non-probabilistic sentence of L tea involving only HOLDS and OCCURS predicates 
and temporal relations. Due to the potential complex nature of action interactions in 
the present framework, the description of action interactions will be specific to a given 
planning problem. 
Throughout this section, we will be concerned with deriving a lower bound on the 
chance that a plan achieves a goal. So it will suffice to specify lower bounds on all 
probability values. 
61.1. The planning environment 
The planning environment is described in terms of the chances that facts hold and 
events occur: 
pn,,w(.~OLDS(FA, tF, t;,) 2 a, 
p,,,,,v ( ~OCCURS( EV, tE, t;) ) b a, 
as well as temporal constraints relating the times of facts and events: 
(now ,< tF < tE) . 
6. I .2. Feasibility conditions 
Action feasibility conditions FC are described by sentences of the form 
pm,,(lWWA,tA) 1 FC) 2 a, 
where tFC is the earliest time associated with FC and tFC < tA. 
Feasibilil:y conditions can be used to represent interference between actions. For 
example, the following sentence says that action A2 is not feasible as long as Al is 
being perfo’rmed. 
P,,,,JI’EAS(A:!, tA2) 1 OCC(AI 9 tA, 7 t:, > A (tA, < fA2 < t;, )) = 0. 
6.1.3. Executability conditions 
Executability conditions EC are described by sentences of the form 
P,,,((JCC(A, tA, t;) 1 An(A, tA) A EC) > ff, (16) 
where the earliest time associated with EC is tEC, and tEC < tk. Executability conditions 
are assumed to be independent of the action with which they are associated: 
1x41. Pn,,,(ECI ATT(A,tA)) = P,m(EC). 
So a lower bound for the chance that the action is executable can be expressed in terms 
of the executability specification (16) and the chance of the executability condition: 
P,,,,(OCC(A,tA,t;) IAu(A,tA)) > 
P,,,,(OCC(A,tA,t;) IAn(A,tA) AEC) . P,w,(EC). 
Assumption IA1 reduces the complexity of inference and is reasonable in most cases. 
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6.1.4. Effects and ramijcation conditions 
We describe positive action effects by sentences of the form: 
P ,,,,I ,(EFF 1 OWA, tA, t;, A RAW 2 a, (17) 
where RAM represents the ramification conditions for effect EFF of action A, the latest 
time associated with EFF iS tEFF, the WkSt time associated with RAM is tRAM, and 
GRAM < tkFF Ramification conditions are assumed to be independent of the action with 
which they are associated: 
IA2. P,,,,(RAM 1 OCC(A, t,z,, t;)) = P,,,,(RAM). 
So a lower bound for the chance of the action’s positive effects can be expressed 
in terms of the positive effect specification (17) and the chance of the ramification 
condition: 
P,,,,,dEFF 1 OCCCA, tA, t:, 1 2 
P,,,,,v(EFF 1 OCC(A, t.4, t;) A RAM) . P,,,,(RAM). 
6.1.5. The goal description 
The goal description is any non-probabilistic sentence of L,,, involving only HOLDS 
and OCCURS predicates and temporal relations. For example, the goal of getting to the 
bank by 5:OOpm may be represented as 
Elfi, t2 (tl < 5:OO) A HOLDS( loc(me,bank), tl , t2). 
61.6. The probability of goal achievement 
In order to compare alternative plans, we will be interested in inferring the chance 
that trying to attempt a given plan achieves a given goal. We speak of trying to attempt 
a plan since if the plan is not feasible it cannot be attempted. For a plan with n action 
attempts such that tA, < tA2 6 . . . < tA,, a lower bound on the chance that trying to 
attempt the plan achieves goal G is the chance that the attempt of the plan brings about 
the goal and that the plan is feasible: I3 
FEAS(AittA;) I /\An(AjvtA,) (18) 
j<i 
This is only a lower bound since the goal may come about even if some of the actions 
are not attempted. 
I3 Haddawy 12 1 1 derives this expression from an expression for the expected utility of trying to attempt an 
action. 
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If the failed attempt of a plan has no chance of achieving our goal, we can provide 
a precise expression for the chance that trying to attempt the plan achieves the goal by 
focusing on the chance that trying to attempt the plan achieves both the occurrence of 
the plan and the goal. This is just the chance that the plan attempt brings about both 
the plan occurrence and the goal multiplied by the chance that the plan is feasible: 
FEAS(Ai,tA,) 1 AAn(AjvtAj) . (19) 
.j<i 
6.1.7. Infertkg the probability of a goal from action specijications 
Describing the feasibility, executability, and effects of actions is only useful for plan- 
ning purposes if these descriptions can be combined to infer the chance that a plan will 
achieve a given goal. We show here how these descriptions can be combined to infer 
the chance that attempting a single action will result in the action occurring and in a 
given goal being achieved. For plans consisting of multiple actions we need additional 
information concerning the interactions of the actions composing the plan. Since numer- 
ous types of action interactions are possible, we will give a specific example later of 
performing such inference for a more complex plan. 
Suppose we wish to achieve goal G and suppose that G is an effect of action A. The 
chance that trying to attempt A results in A occurring and achieves G is 
P,,,,,(GAOCC(&tA,t;, IAn(A,tA)) -Pnow(FEf4S(A,t~)). 
By the definition of c-prob the first term can be written as 
By axiom ACTI, 
So the chance of achieving goal G can be expressed in terms of the feasibility, exe- 
cutability, and effects of A: 
f’n,,w(~~OCC(A,t~,t:,) IAn(A,tA)) ~P,,,w(F~~~(A,~A)) = 
p,,ow(G (OCC(A, tA* t;>) * Pnow(OCC(A, tA, t;> 1 An(A, tA)) 
. Pn,,w(FE~S(A, tA) ). 
If action A has ramification, executability, and feasibility conditions associated with it 
then by independence assumptions IA1 and IA2 we have 
288 l? Haddawy/Art$icial Intelligence 80 (1996) 243-308 
P,,,,,(GAOCC(A,t,,t:,) IAn(A,tA)) .P,,,w(FEAS(A,~A)) 3 
f’i,,,,(G 1 OCC(A, tA, t;> A RAW . p,,,w(OCC(A, tA, t;> 1 Ap(A, tA) A EC) 
. f’n,,dFEAS(A, tA) t FC) . PmdRAM) . PmdEC) . PmndFC). 
6.2. Planning example 
This section presents a detailed example of the use of the representational framework 
in reasoning about plans. Suppose I am at home and would like to go to my favorite 
restaurant for dinner. The restaurant does not take reservations. Under normal circum- 
stances, I can get a table within fifteen minutes but if a theater performance has ended 
in the last hour, the wait could be much longer. We would like to determine the chance 
that the plan consisting of starting my car and driving to the restaurant will result in 
having dinner without having to wait too long. A further complication is that my car 
is fairly unreliable and is only likely to start if the temperature is above freezing. The 
problem is described by specifying the feasibility, executability, and effects for the two 
actions, the interactions between the actions, the state of the planning environment, and 
the desired goal. 
start (car) 
Executability. I can usually start my car if the temperature is above freezing while I 
am trying to start it. 
vt,v (t, > now) --+ 
pmv(owst~t(c~), t,, ts + 1) I 
ATT(start(car),t,) AHOLDS((temp> 32),t,,t,+ 1)) 20.95. (20) 
Feasibility. I can attempt to start my car if I have the keys and am at the same location 
as the car. 
vt,y,t’,X (ts > now) + 
P,,,(FEAS(start(car), ts) I 
HOZBS( have( keys), t’, ts) A 
HOLDS(loc(me, n), t’, ts) A 
HOLDS(loc(car,x),t’,t,)) = 1. (21) 
drive( home,restaurant) 
Effects. There is at least an 80% chance that if I drive to the restaurant I will get a 
table within 15 minutes, as long as no theater performance ended within an hour of my 
arrival at the restaurant. 
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Vtd, tii P,,,,“( 3, t’ (t& < t < ti + 15) A OCCURS( get(table), t, t’) 1 
OCC( drive( home,restaurant), td, t:) A 
dt,,, t;, (t;, < t; 6 t;, + 60) A 
OCCURS( performance, t,, , t;, ) ) 3 0.8. (22) 
Executability. I can successfully drive to the restaurant if I can first start my car. Notice 
that the executability condition is the occurrence of the action of starting my car. 
Vt, t,f (td > now) -+ 
P,,,,,( OCC( drive( home,restaurant) , td, td + 10) 1 
A7T( drive( home,restaurant) , td) A OCC( start( car), t, td) ) = 1. (23) 
Feasibility. I can attempt to drive from home to the restaurant if both I and my car are 
at home. 
V’t, td (td > now) -+ 
I’,,,,,( FEAS( drive( home,restaurant), td) 1 
HOLDS(loc(me,home) , t, td) A 
HOLDS( loc( car,home) , t, td ) ) = 1. (24) 
Action interactions 
We assume that the actions of starting the car and driving to the restaurant do not 
negatively influence one another. This is represented by the following three sentences. 
Attempting to start the car does not negatively influence the feasibility of driving the 
car at a later time. 
~hf,t.,,x,y (ts < &I) -+ 
p,,,(FEAS(drive(x,y),td) IATT(start(car),t,)) b 
p,,,(FEAS(drive(x,y),td)). (25) 
Starting the car does not negatively influence the effects of driving to the restaurant at 
a later time. 
P,,,,,,,(3t,t’ (ti < t < tL+ 15) ~OCCURS(get(table),t,t’) 1 
OCC( drive( home,restaurant), td, t>) A OCC( start( car), t,, t:) ) 2 
P,,,,,,,(3t, t’ (r:, < t < ti + IS) A OCCURS(get(table), t, t’) I 
OCC( drive( home,restaurant) , td, ti) ) . (26) 
Attempting to drive to the restaurant does not negatively influence the executability of 
starting the car at an earlier time. 
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VtdJsJ: 0: <&I) -+ 
P,,,(OCC(staNcar), t,, t:) I 
A7T( start (car), ts) A A’IT( drive( home,restaurant) , td) ) > 
P,,,,(OCC(start(car), tS, t:> 1 AZT(start(car), tS)). 
Planning environment 
We have the following time line. 
(now < to < t1). 
There is an 80% the temperature will be above freezing this evening. 
P,,,,,,,(HULDS((temp > 32),tl,tl + 120)) =0.8. 
I am certain to have my keys this evening. 
P,,,,~,(HOLDS(have(keys), to, tl)) = 1. 
I am certain to be at home this evening. I4 
P,l,,w(HOLDS(loc(me,home),to,tl + 1)) = 1. 
My car is likely to be at home this evening. 
P,,,(HOLDS(loc(car,home), to, tl + 1)) 2 0.95. 
There is no theater performance this evening. 
P,,),(Zlt, t’ (t’ 6 tl + 120) A OCCURS(performance, t, t’)) = 0. 
Goal 
My goal is to get a table within thirty minutes of tl. 
3tG, td (tl < tc < tl + 30) A OCCURS(get(table), tG, th). 
The derivation 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
We want to derive the chance that the plan consisting of starting my car at time tl 
and driving to the restaurant at time tl + 1 will occur and achieve the goal: 
I4 Since my location is essentially within my control, this would more accurately be represented with a 
stay-at-location action: 
Vx,n,tP,,,(OCC(stayy(x,n),r,r+n) 1 ATT(stay(x,n),t))= 1, 
Vx,n,tP,,~(HOLDS(loc(me,x),r,t+n) 1 UCC(stay(n,n),t,r+n))= I, 
where stay(x, n) means that I stay at location x for n time units. For simplicity of exposition we have omitted 
this action from the plan. 
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Pnd!3tc,t~ (tG d tl i-30) r\OCCU~&s(get(table),tG,&)A 
OCC(drive( home,restaurant), tl + 1, tl + 11) A 
OCC( start(car), tl , tl + 1) 1 
AV(drive(home,restaurant), tl + 1) r\ATT(start(car), rl)) (34) 
. P,,,,J: FEAS(drive(home,restaurant), tl + 1) 1 ATT(start(car), tl )) (35) 
. Z’,,,,,J: FEAS( start(car), tl )). (36) 
We calculate a lower bound on the chance of each of the terms (34)) (35)) and (36). 
Calculation of (36) 
By axiom FOL5 and (21) , 
p,,,,(lCEAS(start(car), TV ) 1 
iYOZDS( have( keys), to, tl ) A 
IfOLDS(loc(me,home),ro,tl) AHOLDS(loc(car,home),to,t~)) = 1. (37) 
By Theorem 11 and (30), (31), and (32) it follows that 
P,,,,,(jYOLDS(have(keys), to, tl ) A HOZ_DS(loc(me,home), to, rl ) A 
IYOLDS(loc(car,home),to,tl)) 2 0.95. (38) 
By the definition of c-prob and Theorem 10 applied to (37) and (38), 
P,,,,,(t:EAS(start(car),tl)) Z 0.95. (39) 
Calculation of (35) 
By axiom FOL5 and (24), 
P,,,,,( RZAS(drive(home,restaurant), tl + 1) 1 
IYOLDS(loc(me,home) , to, tl + 1) A 
ifOLDS(loc(car,home),to,tl + 1)) = 1. 
By Theorem 11 and (31) and (32), 
P,,,,,(IYOLDS(loc(me,home), to, tl + 1) A 
IYOLDS(loc(car,home), to, tl + 1)) 2 0.95. 
(40) 
(41) 
By the definition of c-prob and Theorem 10 applied to (40) and (41)) 
P,,,,( IXAS( drive( home,restaurant), tl + 1) ) > 0.95. (42) 
By FOL5 and the field axioms applied to (42) and (25), 
P,,,,,,,( FEAS( drive( home,restaurant) , tl + 1) I AZT( start( car), tl ) ) 2 0.95. (43) 
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Calculation of (34) 
By the definition of c-prob and axiom ACTl, term (34) may be rewritten as 
P,,,,(3tc, t; (tG < t1 + 30) A OCCURS(get(table), tG, td) A 
OCC( drive( home,restaurant) , tl + 1, tl + 11) A 
OCC( start( car), tl , tl + I ) 1 
ATT(drive(home,restaurant), tl + 1) A 
ATT( start( car), tl ) ) = 
p,,,,v( 3tG, t; (tG < t] + 30) A OCCURS(get(table), tG, td) ) 
OCC(drive(home,restaurant), tt + 1, tl + 11) A 
OCC( start( car), tl , tl + 1) ) (44) 
I’,,,,,“( OCC( drive( home,restaurant) , tl + 1, tl + 11) A 
UCC(start(car), tl, tl + 1) / 
AT;r( drive( home,restaurant), tl + 1) A 
ATT(start(car), tl)). (45) 
Since (tl + 11 < tc < tl f26) --) (tG < tl+30), by Theorem 10 we have the following 
inequality for term (44). 
P,,,,,+(gtG, r; (to 6 tl + 30) A OCCURS(get(table), tG, t&) 1 
OCC(drive(home,restaurant), tl + I, tl + II) A 
OCC(start(car),tl,tl + 1)) 2 
P,,,,(%, t; (tt i- 11 6 to 6 tl -I- 26) A OCCURS(get(table), tG, td) 1 
OCC(drive(home,restaurant), tl + 1, tl + 11) A 
OCC(start(car),tl,tl + 1)). 
By assumption (26) and axiom FOL.5, we have 
(46) 
~tow(~tG, t; (tt + 11 6 to 6 tl + 26) A OCCURS(get(table), tG, td) 1 
OCC( drive( home,restaurant) , t] + 1, tl + 11) A 
OCC(start(car), tl, tl + 1)) > 
~l,,,v(%, td (tl + 11 6 k 6 tl + 26) A OCCURS(get(table), tc, t;) 1 
OCC( drive( home,restaurant) , t 1 + 1, t 1 + 11) ) . 
By the definition of c-prob, term (45) may be written as 
(47) 
(48) 
I’,,,,,,,(OCC( drive( home,restaurant), tl + 1, tl + 1 1) 1 
ATT(drive(home,restaurant), tI + 1) A OCC(start(car), tl, tl + 1)) 
. ~~,,,“(OCC(start(car), tl, ti + 1) I 
(49) 
AZ? start(car) , tl > A A7T( drive( home,restaurant) , tl + 1) ) . (50) 
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By assumption (27) and axiom FOL5, we have the following inequality for term (50). 
P,,,,(OCC(start(car), tl, TV + 1) I 
AIT( start( car), tl ) A AIT( drive( home,restaurant) , tl + 1) ) > 
P,,,,,(OCC(start(car), TV, TV + I > 1 AIT(start(car), tt )) 
So we have the following inequality for term (34). 
(51) 
P,,,,,,(qtc, t; (tc 6 tt + 30) A OCCURS(get(table), tc, td) A 
OCC(drive(home,restaurant), tl + 1, tl + 11) A 
OCC(start(car), t1, t1 + 1) 1 
ATT(drive(home,restaurant),tt + 1) AAi’T(start(car),tl)) > 
flld3tG, th (tl + 11 < to Q ti + 26) A OCCURS(get(table), tG, td) 1 
OCC(drive(home,restaurant), tl + 1, tl + 11)) (52) 
P,,,,( OCC( drive( home,restaurant) , tl + 1, tl + 11) I 
AZT( drive( home,restaurant), tl + 1) A 
OCC(start(car), tl, tl + 1) (53) 
+ P,I,,,(OCC(start(car), tl, tl + 1) I ATT(start(car), tl)). (54) 
Now we derive numerical bounds for the terms (52), (53), (54). First we derive a 
bound for term (52). By axiom FOL5 and (22), 
I’,,,,,,,( 3t, t’ (tt + 11 < t 6 tI + 26) A OCCURS(get(table), t, t’) I 
OCC(drive(home,restaurant), tl + 1, tt + 11) A 
dt,,,t; (t; < tl + 11 < t; +60) A 
OCCURS(performance, t,, ti,)) 2 0.8. 
By Theorem 10 and (33), 
(55) 
P,,,,,,( 13, t’ (t’ < tl + 11 < t’ + 60) A OCCURS(performance, t, t’)) = 1. (56) 
So by the a,ssumption that ramification conditions are independent of the action occur- 
rence, the dafinition of c-prob, and (55) and (56), 
P,low(3, t’ (tl + 11 < t < tl + 26) A OCCURS(get(table), t, t’) I 
OCC(drive(home,restaurant), tl + 1, tl + 11)) 2 0.8. (57) 
Next we derive a value for term (53). By axiom FOL5 and (23), 
P,,,, ( OCC( drive( home,restaurant) , tl + 1, t 1 + 11) I 
ATT( drive( home,restaurant) , tI + 1) A 
OCC(start(car),tl,tl + 1)) = 1. (58) 
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Finally we derive a bound for term (54). By axiom FOL5 and (20)) 
p,,,,,(OCC(start(car), TV, TV + 1) I 
ATT( start( car), tl ) A 
HOLDS( (temp > 32)) tl , tl + 1) ) 3 0.95. (59) 
By Theorem 15 and (29), 
P,,,,,(HOLDS((temp > 32),tt,tt + 1)) 2 0.8. (60) 
So by the assumption that executability conditions are independent of the action attempt, 
the definition of c-prob, and (59) and (60)) 
P,ro~v(OCC(start(car), 21, TV + I> I 
(61) 
ATT(start(car), tt )) > (0.8) (0.95) = 0.76. 
From (56), (57), and (61) we obtain a lower bound on the probability of term (34) 
Of 
0.8. I . 0.76 = 0.60. (62) 
Finally, combining the probability values from (39), (43), and (62) we obtain the 
lower bound on the chance that the plan achieves the goal: 
p,,,,,,,( Ito, t; (to 6 tt + 30) A OCCURS( get(table), to, t;, A 
OCC( drive( home,restaurant), tl + 1, tl + 11) A 
OCC(start(car),tt,tt + 1) 1 
ATT( drive( home,restaurant) , tl + 1) A 
ATT( start( car), t] ) ) 
. Pnoly( FEAS(drive(home,restaurant), tl + 1) 1 ATT( start(car), rl ) ) 
. P,,,,( FEAS(start(car), tt )) > 
0.60. 0.95 ’ 0.95 = 0.54. (63) 
6.3. The quali$cation, frame, and ramijcation problems 
Probabilistic representations address the qualification problem by allowing one to 
summarize exceptions [42]. For example, we can reason about the chance that my car 
will start given that I turn the key, even though many events may prevent the car from 
starting. We simply say that the probability my car will start given that I turn the key is, 
say, 0.98. This probability summarizes the fact that low likelihood events, like a potato 
being stuck in my tailpipe, can prevent the car from starting. We can also say that the 
probability that my car will start given that I turn the key and that a potato is stuck in 
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the tailpipe is zero, without contradiction. The conditional probability appropriate to our 
state of knowledge would then be used at inference time. 
The reader will notice that in the previous planning example we have avoided reason- 
ing about the persistence of facts by formulating the planning problem in such a way 
that actions bring about conditions just when they are needed The current work does not 
propose solutions to either the frame or ramification problems. In fact, the problems are 
magnified by the fact that actions and events may occur concurrently. So frame axioms 
would need to be predicated on the lack of occurrence of actions or events which could 
negate a condition. For example, to say that the color of my car does not change over 
an interval during which it is not painted, we might write 
v’to, t19 t29 x Pn,nv(3t3 HOLDS( color( car,x) , t2, t3) 1 
HOLDS(color(car, x>,to, tl) A 
-4XC( paint( car), tl , t2) ) = 1. 
Several researchers have addressed the problem of projecting the effects of actions 
and plans in a probabilistic framework. Dean and Kanazawa [ 121 present an approach to 
projection using a Bayesian network model. I5 The tendency of propositions to remain 
true over time is modeled with conditional probability statements that indicate the 
probability that a proposition P is true at time t conditioned on whether or not P was 
true at the previous time point and whether or not an event known to make P true 
or false occurred in the interim. A Bayesian network model is created which contains 
a node for each proposition and event of interest at every one of a set of discrete 
time points. Projection is performed using one of the standard inference algorithms for 
Bayesian networks. 
Hanks [28] presents an approach to reasoning about projection in which knowledge 
of the worl’d is represented in terms of probabilities that propositions are true at various 
time points, but not necessarily at every time point as in Dean and Kanazawa’s approach. 
The dynamics of the world is modeled with causal rules that describe the tendency of 
a proposition to change state as a result of an event and with persistence rules that 
describe the chance that a proposition changes state over an interval during which no 
causally relevant event is known to occur. The projector answers queries of the form “is 
the probability that 4 will hold at time t greater than 7 ?” The algorithm is particularly 
distinguished by its efficiency, which it gains by searching only for past evidence relevant 
to the query and by making only relevant distinctions when projecting effects forward 
in time. In contrast, Dean and Kanazawa’s approach computes the probability of every 
proposition at every point in time. 
More recent work in this area has discussed appropriate ways to structure Bayesian 
networks in order to obtain a compact representation that is sufficiently expressive to 
reason about projection [ 8,9]. 
Is The framework is also described by Dean and Wellman I 131. 
296 
7. Related work 
P. Huddawy/Artijicial Intelligence 80 (1996) 243-308 
7.1. Theories of objective chance 
Three outstanding subjective theories of objective chance are those of van Fraassen 
[ 571, Lewis [ 391, and Skyrms [ 521. Van Fraassen’s model of objective chance is more 
constrained than Lewis’ model which is more constrained than Skyrms’ model. Thus, 
in van Fraassen’s model, chance has more inherent properties than in either Lewis’ or 
Skyrms’ models. Since van Fraassen’s theory is the only one of the three that is cast in 
a temporal framework, it was used as the point of departure for the mode1 of objective 
chance in f&. 
Van Fraassen presents a semantic theory that models subjective probability and ob- 
jective chance, using a future-branching mode1 of time points. Van Fraassen places two 
constraints on objective chance: 
( 1) The chance of a past is either 0 or 1, depending on whether or not it actually 
occurred. 
(2) Chance at a time is completely determined by the history of the world up to that 
time. 
From these assumptions, he shows the following relation between subjective probability 
and objective chance 
Pt(X I Y) = EY[G(X)l9 
where P, is the subjective probability at time t, C, is the objective chance at time t, Ey 
is the expected value given Y, and provided the truth of Y depends only on the history 
up to t. This relation entails a version of Miller’s principle relating subjective probability 
and objective chance. A similar relation holds between objective chances at different 
times, but van Fraassen does not demonstrate this. In van Fraassen’s models, objective 
chance can change with time but, in contrast to the present work, truth values cannot. 
He does not provide a logical language for his theory. 
7.2. Temporal probability logics 
The theory of computing literature contains several examples of logics that can rep- 
resent both time and probability [ 27,29,38]. The focus of these logics is on reasoning 
about probabilistic programs and distributed systems. The logics do not attempt to model 
causality or to distinguish between different types of temporal objects such as facts and 
events; hence, they are not suitable for reasoning about actions and plans. 
Kanazawa [ 311 presents a logic, C,,, of time and probability. The language allows 
quantification over time points but is propositional otherwise. The language contains a 
P operator for representing probability. The P operator is not temporally indexed so the 
language cannot represent he change of probability over time. Furthermore, the language 
does not allow nesting of probability operators. Like f&,, L,, contains numeric functions 
for representing probability distributions. Because Kanazawa’s focus is on representing 
the tendency of facts to persist through time, his representation of facts and events 
differs from ours. He describes a fact as “something that once it becomes true tends 
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to stay true for some time”. Facts are associated with temporal intervals. Events take 
place instantaneously and are associated with a single time point. He distinguishes three 
types of events: persistence causation events are associated with a fact becoming true; 
persistence termination events are associated with a fact becoming false; point events 
are facts that stay true for only an instant. L,, represents actions as events. 
Like the models for .f&, Kanazawa’s models contain a collection of world-histories. 
He does not impose a branching time structure on the histories. The semantics of the 
P operator are defined in terms of probability distributions over world-histories. Fact 
tokens and event tokens are equated with (temporal interval, world) pairs. 
Dean and Wellman [ 131 present a propositional temporal probability logic similar to 
Kanazawa’s. They extend Shoham’s [50] propositional temporal logic by introducing 
a probability operator. The probability operator cannot be nested but can otherwise be 
combined freely with other logical operators. The probability operator is not temporally 
indexed. A model contains of a universe of time points, a set of possible time lines, a 
binary relation over time points, and a discrete probability measure over the time lines. 
The models differ from those for C,, by not imposing a branching structure on the time 
lines nor other constraints on the elements of the models. 
7.3. Tempo)ral ogics of actions and plans 
Shoham [51] presents a branching time logic that formalizes the relation between 
time, knowledge, and action. Knowledge is defined in the standard way for modal logic 
and actions are defined as the ability to make choices among sets of world-histories. The 
model formalizes the notion that actions can only be performed under certain conditions. 
Shoham’s logic does not capture the fact that actions cannot influence the past. 
Pelavin [ 43,441 develops a future-branching time logic for reasoning about planning 
problems involving concurrent actions and external events. He starts with Allen’s [ l] 
linear temporal logic of time intervals and extends it with two modal operators, ZNEV 
and IFTRIED, to reason about future-branching time and action effects, respectively. 
INEV is exactly our 0 operator. IFTRZED is a counterfactual operator that associates 
the attempt of an action with the truth of a sentence. The semantics of the operator 
are based on Stalnaker’s and Lewis’ theories of counterfactuals. IFTRIED captures the 
temporal relation of action and effect-an action cannot affect the state of the world at 
any time preceding its attempt. 
Pelavin represents actions and plans uniformly as “plan instances”. A plan instance 
is an ordered pair: a set of basic action instances and a set of event instances, brought 
about by the basic actions. An action is attempted if its basic action instances occur 
and it occurs if its basic action instances and its event instances all occur. Since a 
plan instance is a single ordered pair and the times associated with the event and basic 
action instances are fixed and all terms in the language are rigid designators, a plan 
instance cannot occur more than once in a world-history. If we want to allow two 
instances of the same plan to occur in a world-history, they must have different names. 
Pelavin cre,ates these different names by allowing an interval to be associated with a 
plan instance e.g. pi@Z . This is to be interpreted as saying that plan instance pi occurs 
during interval 1. But he does not provide a semantic definition for the @ operator 
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to formalize the intuitive interpretation. Furthermore, by using different names for two 
occurrences of the same plan he has no way of saying that two instances of the same 
plan occur. 
Conditional chance is used in this paper to represent effects. Since chance can be 
conditioned on any sentence, C,,, can represent the effects of a wide variety of different 
phenomena. In Pelavin’s logic, IFTRIED only associates effects with action attempts, so 
effects of genera1 events cannot be represented. The use of conditional chance eliminates 
the need for a separate counterfactual operator and its semantic counterpart: the similarity 
measure over worlds. Furthermore, our representation of actions has a more intuitively 
appealing semantics. Unlike Pelavin, we do not assume that actions are always feasible. 
Such an assumption is unacceptable since it is hard to imagine what it would mean for 
the basic action instances of two inconsistent actions, like concurrently remaining still 
and moving, to all occur. 
Pelavin’s use of a Stalnaker/Lewis counterfactual operator to represent action effects 
results in some undesirable inferences. Consider the sentence “If I were to attempt to 
stay at home all day, then if I were to attempt to walk from home to the store at noon, 
I would succeed in walking from home to the store at noon.” This sentence can be 
represented in Pelavin’s logic by nesting two IFTRZED operators. If being at home is 
the executability condition for going from home to the store, Pelavin points out that 
the sentence is true in his logic. But attempting to stay home all day and attempting 
to go to the store at noon are incompatible. So it seems unreasonable for this sentence 
to be true in the intended interpretation I6 In C,,, attempting to stay home all day and . 
attempting to go the store at noon are incompatible, so their conjunction would not be 
feasible, and hence going to the store would have zero chance of occurring given that 
one was staying home all day. 
Skyrms provides an elegant probabilistic account of counterfactuals based on the 
notion of objective chance [52, Chapter IIA] and discusses the semantics of iterated 
probability conditionals [52, Appendix 31. He shows that the iterated probability con- 
ditionals can lead to more intuitive inferences than iterated Stalnaker/Lewis condition- 
als. 
7.4. Decision-theoretic planners 
A number of researchers have recently been working on the problem of building 
decision-theoretic planning sytems. This work can be classified into two main schools. 
The first school attempts to take techniques from classical AI planning and to apply 
them within a decision-theoretic framework. The second school assumes that planning 
problems are describable as Markov processes and attempts to formulate efficient and 
flexible algorithms for solving them. 
Kushmerick et al. [ 35,361 present the BURIDAN planner, which is roughly a proba- 
bilistic version of the SNLP planning algorithm. They characterize the world in terms of 
a probability distribution over propositions and actions in terms of transitions from one 
I6 One might think that the sentence should be correct because going to the store is clipping staying at home, 
but the same problem arises if the temporal order of the actions is reversed. 
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distribution to another. The BURIDAN planner generates a plan that achieves a goal with 
a probability no less than a user-specified threshold. Draper et al. [ 151 have extended 
the algorithm to handle information gathering and contingent actions. 
Haddawy and Suwandi [ 251 present a decision-theoretic refinement planning system 
(DRIPS). ‘The DRIPS planner finds optimal plans for problems described in terms of a 
probability function over world states, a probabilistic model of actions, and a temporal 
utility function. DRIPS can reason about both discrete and continuous attributes, as 
well as metric time. Action descriptions are organized into an abstraction hierarchy. 
DRIPS reasons efficiently by using the hierarchy to prune away suboptimal classes 
of plans. Haddawy and Doan [23] describe the theory of abstraction used by the 
planner. 
Wellman’s SUDO-PLANNER system [ 61,621 eliminates classes of suboptimal plans 
in domains characterized by partially satisfiable goals and actions with uncertain effects. 
It eliminates only those classes of plans which it can prove are dominated without 
resorting to reasoning about tradeoffs. Planning knowledge is represented in the form of 
qualitative probabilistic networks. Plans are functions from observations to actions. The 
planner works by cycling between the processes of model construction and dominance 
proving. h/lode1 construction involves constructing a qualitative probabilistic network 
from a more general knowledge base for the domain. Dominance proving involves using 
knowledge: about the effects of actions and the relative desirability of outcomes to derive 
facts abou: the preferred plan. 
Drummond and Bresina [ 161 present an algorithm for generating plans in stochastic 
temporal domains. They represent the dynamics of the domain as a discrete Markov 
process, where actions and exogenous events are characterized by transition probabilities. 
Goals are temporally qualified sentences. The algorithm works by first projecting a 
single path that satisfies the goal. In generating this path the system explores only likely 
outcomes, ignoring those of low probability. This produces a plan with a lower bound 
probability of achieving the goal. The probability of goal satisfaction can be increased 
by elaborating the plan with additional paths that satisfy the goal. 
Dean et al. [ II] build upon the work of Drummond and Bresina by providing their 
basic plamling algorithm with theoretically sound probabilistic foundations. They present 
a planning algorithm in which the world is modeled as a stochastic automaton consisting 
of a finite set of states; actions are represented by transition probabilities between states; 
goals are represented by reward functions over the states; and plans are policies that 
specify what action to perform in each state. The algorithm starts by generating a policy 
for a simplified world model. It then iteratively expands the world model and generates 
the optimal policy for each expanded model. The expected values of generated plans 
improve a:s a function of computation time and the algorithm can be consulted at any 
time after the initial policy is generated to obtain the best policy so far. In a second 
paper, Dean et al. [IO] discuss decision-theoretic methods for allocating processor time 
to policy generation and world model expansion in time-critical domains. 
Boutilier and Dearden [ 141 investigate planning in time-critical domains represented 
as Markov decision processes. They trade optimality for inference speed by limiting 
search depth and using a heuristic function to estimate the values of states. Actions are 
executed a.s the plan is being constructed. In a second paper [4] they present a method 
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for abstracting the state space of a Markov decision process so that approximately 
optimal policies can be constructed. They prove bounds on the loss of optimality due to 
the use of the abstraction. 
Cassandra et al. [ 61 show how to formulate a planning problem in which the agent 
has incomplete information about the state of the environment as a partially observable 
Markov decision process. They present an algorithm for solving these problems that is 
empirically more efficient than existing algorithms. 
Thiebaux et al. [56] represent planning problems using probabilistic logic and use 
exhaustive search to construct Markov models of plans from this representation. They 
then evaluate the models to determine the expected value of each plan. 
8. Conclusion 
8.1. Contributions 
This paper has presented a framework for representing planning problems that inte- 
grates logical and probabilistic approaches. By drawing on the strength of previous work 
in both areas, we have been able to create a novel synthesis that addresses limitations 
of the traditional planning paradigm under each approach. The contributions made by 
this work fall into three main areas: the development of a vocabulary for describing 
planning problems, the development of a semantic theory that captures desired intuitive 
properties, and the extension of the probabilistic framework to accommodate actions that 
may not be feasible. 
8.1.1. Vocabulary 
We have provided a vocabulary for describing planning problems involving time and 
chance. The language can express the chance of temporally qualified conditions in the 
world as well as the chance of action feasibility, executability, and effects. We can 
represent the extent to which conditions in the world can and cannot be influenced. 
This is an important capability since a planner must be able to reason about what 
conditions it can influence and the extent to which it can influence them. We can 
represent temporal aspects of plans such as concurrent actions and conditions during an 
action that influence its executability and effects. The language distinguishes between 
actions and events. This distinction is important since an agent has much more direct 
control over its actions than over events. The language further distinguishes between 
action attempts and action occurrences. This distinction allows action duration to vary 
as a function of conditions in the world and it allows us to define the notion of 
action feasibility, the importance of which will be discussed below. The language allows 
first-order quantification over time points, probabilities, and domain individuals. This 
produces a language with great representational economy. For example, by quantifying 
over domain individuals we can describe classes of actions and by quantifying over time 
points we can describe states-of-affairs that are valid at each of some range of time 
points. No other currently existing logical language can represent these aspects of time, 
chance, and action. 
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8.1.2. Semantic theory 
We have specified a set of constraints on the model theory that assigns meaning to 
the logical language. A constrained logic is desirable for several reasons. First, the more 
constrained the model theory, the greater the predictive power of the logic. In the extreme 
case, we could constrain the logic to allow only one model, thus giving us complete 
knowledge. But we do not want to overconstrain the logic so that we eliminate models 
that are consistent with our conception of reality in the intended domains of applicability. 
Second, constraints provide guidance in assigning probabilities to sentences. This is an 
important function since the assigning of priors is a notoriously difficult task. So one 
would like: a logic that is as constrained as possible yet does not produce unwarranted 
inferences, The constraints we have imposed on the models capture numerous intuitive 
properties of time and chance in such a way that natural inferences follow directly 
from the semantics. For example, the following properties are a consequence of the 
constraints. 
l The property that facts have higher chance of holding over their subintervals, 
(Theorem 1.5)) is a consequence of semantic constraint (C3) and the definition of 
probability. 
l The property that the past cannot be influenced (axioms IT3-IT6 and Theorems 17- 
23) follows from constraints (Cl ) and (C2) on the accessibility relation, constraint 
(C5) relating the accessibility relation to facts and events, and constraints (C6) 
and (C7) on probability. 
l Miller’s principle (axiom P3), which relates chance over time is a consequence of 
constraints (C6) and (C7). Furthermore, as a consequence of Miller’s principle we 
have lthe property that chance is the expected value of future chance (Theorem 12). 
l The property that inevitability implies certainty (axiom IPI ) follows from semantic 
constraints (C6) and (C7). 
8.1.3. Feasibility 
The integration of both chance and possibility in f&, allowed us to define the notion 
of the chance of feasibility of an action or plan. This concept was then used to define 
the chance that trying to attempt an action will achieve a given goal. This definition is 
important in reasoning about plans because it enables us to compose individual action 
descriptions into descriptions of plans involving multiple actions. Since actions may 
interfere in such a way that their composition may not be feasible, we must be able to 
reason about the effects of possibly infeasible plans. 
Appendix A. Soundness proofs 
We prove the soundness of the more intersting and less commonly known of the 
axioms in section 4. The first few proofs we present in detail. The remaining proofs are 
presented less formally. 
Il. !J,q5 ---f qb. 
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Proof. We prove this sentence valid by showing that it is satisfied by an arbitrary model 
M, world w, and assignment function g[d/t] . By the semantic definitions, 
[ln’q$ -+ q5]“‘w’R’d”’ = true iff 
[I_ (?, 41 ~~~~~t4’l = true or [[@I M+3,Rl’U’l =true. 
The first disjunct is true iff for some w’ such that R(d, w, w’) [$]““V”a’rl”’ = false. If 
this is not the case then 4 is true in all worlds w’ such that R(d, w, w’). And since by 
(C2) R(d, w, w), it follows that q5 is true in w. 0 
12. q (4 + ‘b> 4 CM --+ O/Q). 
Proof. By the semantic definitions, 
[0,(4 --+ #) -+ (0’4 -+ •t~)nM,w,gldl’l = true iff 
[I7 0, (4 4 fi)n”+pfitd”l = true or [[Or4 --+ •’~n”~W.gtd”t = true. 
By the semantic definitions, this is true iff 
[O,$ ; ;$~~~V’fd”’ = false or 
[0,4] ’ ‘(’ = true or 
uaen M,vxId/'l = true
If the first disjunct is not the case then in every world we have -4 V fi. So in every 
world 4 is false or $ is true. If 4 is false in some world, the second disjunct is satisfied 
and we’re done. Otherwise, Cc, must be true in every world, in which case the third 
disjunct is satisfied. 0 
Proof. By the semantic definitions, 
[O,f$ ;kCII;; +nM+‘,@“l = true iff 
uw ~‘~’ = false or [Cl, Cl, ,,q”,w,gtd”l = true. 
If the first disjunct is not the case then q5 is true in all worlds w’ such that R(d, w, w’). 
Now 
uu 0, +n M~w~Rldlrl = true iff u+nMw4[4'I = true 
for all w” such that R(d, w’, w”) and R(d, w, w’). But by (C2) this is true iff 
U41 M.w,g[rl/tl = true for all w’ such that R(d, w, w’). Cl 
14. O,+ + 0, 0, 6 
Proof. By the semantic definitions and the definition of possibility, 
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[O,f$ + Cl, Ot e!~]~‘~“‘~“’ =true iff 
[l&41 
M,w,,Vl d/r1 = true or [IO, Ot +]MYw*R’d’r’ = true. 
If the first disjunct is not the case then 4 is true in some world w” such that R(d, w, w’). 
Now [O, 0, c#‘~“~‘~” = true iff for every world w’ such that R(d, w, w’) there exists 
a world w” such that R(d, w, w”) and [dJJ”‘w’R’d’t’ = true. But by (C2) R(d, w, w”) 
and R(d, w, w’) implies R(d, w’, w”). So w” is the required world w”. q 
NEC. Rule of necessitation: from e!~ infer q ,+. 
Proof. 
DWJI M,w4 = true iff I[d] M, w’, g[ d/t] = true 
for all w’ such that R(d, w, w’). By definition, if 4 is valid then [e5]“+‘” =true for all 
M, w,g. Cl 
P3. Miller’s principle: (ti 3 12) + P,, (4 1 Pt,(qb) 2 a) 2 a. 
Proof. We first prove an expected value property and then use it to prove Miller’s 
principle. Let t and t’ be two time points t < t’ and consider the R-equivalence classes 
of worlds at time t’. Let the variable r range over these equivalence classes. The r form 
a partition of IV, so the probability of a set X can be written as the integral over this 
partition: 
pu)“(x, = 
.I 
$(X I y>pUp (dr). 
rcw 
Since the history up to time t’ determines the probability at time t’, this can be written 
as 
/_&Y‘(X) = 
s 
/-4(X),4 (dr) 9 
rcw 
where & denotes the probability at time t’ in equivalence class Y. Since the probability 
at a given time is assumed to be constant over all worlds in an R-equivalence class, the 
probability at a given time is the expected value of the probability at any future time: 
,uu:‘(X) = ,u;‘(X)pr (dw’). 
J 
W 
Next we show that Miller’s principle is valid in the probability models. By the 
expected value property, 
pu:“(Xrl {w’ : p;‘(x) = a}) = J ,uf’(Xn {w’ : /L;‘(X) = a})& (dw”). 
W 
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Fig. A. I. Model for the proof that inevitability persists. 
Now, by semantic constraints (C6) and (C7) it follows that 
Vww{w’:&X)=cw}, &({w’:&X)=cr})=l 
Vw@{w’: &Y’(X) = cu}, /!q({w’ : p?‘(X) = cx}) =o. 
So we can restrict the integral to the set {w’ : p;‘(X) = a}: 
= 
s 
&“(xn {d : &‘(X) = LY}),u; (dw”). 
{H.‘:/_$‘(X)=a} 
And by the above property again ,I& ( X rl {w’ : ~7’ (X) = a}) = a, so 
=a. s /_L; (dw”), 
{w’:p;,‘(X)=n} 
=cY.pcL:y({w’:/&X) =a},. 
By the semantic definitions it follows that 
P,(q5 A P,,(4) = a) = a-Pr(P,J(d) = a). 
And by a slight generalization of the proof it follows that 
V(tit’) P,(dAP,f(d) 3a) ba.Pt(Pt,(4) >a). 13 
TLl. Facts hold over their subintervals. 
(fl 5 12 5 ts 5 t4) A (fl $t3) A (t2 $t4) --+ 
[HOLDS(FA,tl,t4) -+ HOLDS(FA,t2,t3)]. 
Proof. This follows directly from constraint (C3). 0 
ITl. Inevitability persists. 
(rl 5 t2) + co,,+ + &$I. 
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Proof. The model described in the proof is shown in Fig. A.l. 
[[a,, ((b)II 
Md,~~dIl~I,d2/f21 = true 
iff for all u.’ such that R(dt, w, w’) 
n44 
M,lr’,RIdlltl,d2/rzI =true 
Now suppose that for some w” such that R(&, w, w”), ~~~“~~“.B’di’t’.d2’t2’ = false. 
Then by (Cl), R( dl , w, w”). This is a contradiction. 
So for all w” such that R(d2, w, w”), ~~~“‘W”‘p’d”r”d2’t2’ = true. 0 
IT3. Past facts are inevitable. 
(to 5 [I 5 t2) + [&HOLDS(Q,to,t,) VO,,+OLDS(Q,to,tl)] 
Proof. 
[Ot~H’OfDS( Q, to, tl ) V q tz-JfOLDS( Q, to, tt )I]“~w~~‘dn’ro~d~‘r~~d~‘rz’ = true iff 
[HOL~S( Q, to, t, )nM,w’,RIdo/to,dl/tl.d2/tzl = true 
for all w’ sluch that R(d2, w, w’) or 
JIHOLDS( Q, to, t, )nM.~‘,~ldolto,dl/tI,dz/rzl = false 
for all w’ such that R(d2, w, w’). This is the case iff 
((do,dl), w’) E F(Q) for all w’ such that R(dz,w, w’) or 
((do,dl), w’) $s’ F’(Q) for all w’ such that R(d2, w, w’). 
This last statment follows directly from ((3). 0 
IPl. Inevitability implies certainty: 0, (4) --+ Pt (4) = 1. 
Proof. We prove this sentence valid by showing that it is satisfied by an arbitrary model 
M, world VV, and assignment function g[d/t] . By the semantic definitions, 
[Elt( q5) -+ Pt(+) = lj”,w,Rldlfl = true iff 
uotwn M,w,ddlrl =true or p,(4) =I~~wWl =true. 
The first disjunct holds if for some w’ such that R(d, w, w’) [4n”‘w”“d’r’= false. 
If this is not the case then [+]“‘w”“d”‘= true for all w’ such that R(d, w, w’). So 
R; c {w’ : ~~nM,w.sIdlrl = true}. But by Meta-Theorem 2, ,uz(Rz) = 1. So ,u~<{w’ : 
u+n M.W'&I dltl = true}) = 1. And from the semantic definitions it follows that 
[P,(4) = ln”++,gldltl = true. 0 
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Fig. A.2. Model for the proof that current chance is inevitable. 
IP2. Current chance is inevitable: O,P,(q5) > cy -+ q ,P,($) > (Y. 
Proof. The model described in the proof is shown in Fig. A.2. 
[O,P,( q5) > #,w,x’d’r’ = true iff UP!< 4) 3 ojj”‘w’g’d’f’ = true 
for some w’ such that R(d,w,w'). This is the case iff ,$‘({w” : [q%]“*w”*pid’r’ =
true}) > (Y for some w’ such that R(d, w, w'). Choose an arbitrary w” such that 
R(d,w,w"). By (C2), R(d,w',wO). Hence by (C6), p$(({w” : ~c$~“~~“~~‘~“’ = 
true}) 3 cy. Cl 
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